Islamic Twists and The Decline of Islamism
In Indonesia

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Abstract

Islamism or the ideologization of Islam has actually grown and embraced by some Islamic leaders when politics is used as a medium of struggle. Since its inception in late 1945, Islamic political parties and their leaders have placed Islam as party ideology. Despite the incapability of Islamic politics to not accepting the policy of “Azas Tunggal” (sole ideology) as politically set up by the New Order government, the passion of Islamism seems to reappear when the political reforms took place following the fall of Suharto in 1998. An issue to make Indonesia an Islamic State was raised again by the proponents of political Islam through Islamic political party as well as by those who were proponents of transnational Islamic organizations. It is argued that Islamic twists which are marked by the increase in Indonesian Muslim religiosity must be strengthening a tendency of Islamism which develops in society since it is a part of Muslim’s religious piety. However, Islamism seemed to be declining as though it suggests that there is no correlation between the tendency of Islamism and the increase of people’s religious mindedness. Amidst the tendency of Muslims to practice true religion, for example, the Islamic political parties have decreased in its support by Muslims.

Keywords: Islamism, Politics, Religiousity, Radicalism, Party.

Abstrak


Kata kunci: Islamisme, Politik, Religiusitas, Radikalisme, Partai.
Introduction

The spirit of the bearers of political Islam in Indonesia shows a volatile developments, and later it tends to decline. Beginning in the early twentieth century when the awareness of Indonesian nationalism began to grow, the spirit grows largely through a political organization fighting with the secular and non-Islamic political parties. Islamic political party is a party that fought in the name of Islam group, catering for the interests of Muslims. Although it is noticeably a simplification, the Islamic political parties usually use Islam as their ideological base. Thus, they want to dye this life with the values of Islam and even want Islamic law enforced through political decisions. This trend actually was not done only by political parties because socio-religious organizations also have used or placed Islam as their ideological basis. In addition to the desire for Islam to be practiced thoroughly in society, the values of Islam are expected to color the life of Indonesian society in general. This tendency is what is by Bassam Tibi (2012) referred to as Islamism, i.e. an idea or ideology that tends to use Islam as a political ideology.

With such a perspective it has been argued that the more religious the Islamic community the stronger their spirit of political Islam would be. In this case the Islamic political party is assumed to be so powerful thrust of Islam and plans to build a society with Islamic base. Public response to Islamic parties would be great as a medium for support for the struggle of political Islam. However, such an assumption is not entirely correct because the development of political Islam in Indonesia is not strengthened, as seen from the weakening of Islamic political parties. This is in line with what is found by Bayat (2013) suggesting that the tendency to use Islam as a political tool or to place it as political ideology in many countries is changing. This article is to examine whether the strengthening of religiosity of a society goes hand in hand with the strengthening of political Islam. It is to see why support for Islamic parties continues to decline and even many Islamic parties turned into secular.

Islamism Turn

Since the emergence of the debate on the ideological basis of the State in “Pantiya 9” which was formed preceding Indonesia’s independence, the desire to implement Islam in National politics have appeared in some Muslim leaders’ mind. Such a desire is explicitly manifest in what is called the “Piagam Jakarta” (Jakarta Charter), although the concept contained in the Charter that later became the ideological basis of the State was amended so that it overrode that desire. That desire is actually understandable considering the majority of the people who are later called the nation of Indonesia is Muslim, reaching almost 90 percent. In addition, because Islam has been embraced by the majority of Indonesian, and its teachings in general have been entrenched, this religion had also been a symbol of political resistance during the Dutch colonialism.
The event of acceptance of Pancasila, and not Islam, as the ideology base of the state has important significance which marks the character of Indonesian Muslim. The “Paniuja 9” and politicians who took part in the preparation for Indonesia’s independence seemed to be more concerned with unity rather than political interests of Muslims even though a larger number of them were Muslims. Even among devout Muslims who were involved in politics there was no one who insistently asked that Islam be placed as the base of the State after their desire was rejected by others who objected. They realize that although they were majority, they lived in diversity together with the followers of other religions.

Political Islam that was carried out by some political parties did not show the actual turmoil towards the reinforcement. Although during the New Order government the Islamic political party was considered a dangerous rival because of Muslim support, political Islam in fact continued to decline, as seen from the vote share of Islamic parties in the general elections. During the 1950s where political dynamics were so large, two Islamic political parties, Masjumi and Partai NU, tended to talk about their sectarian political interests rather than the interest of Muslim community. In this case Muslims were actually split, so that the Islamic political struggle wasn’t single nor focused. They were influenced by different ideology, resulting in difference in their political struggle. Their differences in ideology which derived from differences in social organization which sustained them, namely Masjumi, was supported by organizations such as Muhammadiyah while Partai NU was supported by members of NU, considering this party was formerly a socio-religious organization.

It could be said that political Islam through which they fought was actually limited to the so-called application of Islamic law. In this case they were fighting for upholding Islamic shari’a through politics to be decided as the source of all laws or regulations in Indonesia. Therefore, although this desire was not great, it still constituted an indication of their attachment to Islam. Such attachment was also reasonable because, as happens in any community, they followed the teachings of religion they adhered to. Partai NU, for example, ever awarded a title “waliy al-amrial-dhoruri bi al-syaukah” to President Soekarno with which the President was regarded as an “Islamic leader” (Emir) within the emergency position. By positioning the President as the leader of Islam, then any decision relating to religious domain he made were legitimate in Islam perspective. Nonetheless, because of the ideology or philosophy that affected them was different, it is very common that the existing Islamic parties did not have the same political opinion. Herbeit Feith (1970) has highlighted the factors that affected the four major parties at the time, i.e. the two Islamic parties, NU and Masjumi, and two secular parties PNI and PKI. The first two were informed by Islam while the two others were influenced by secular philosophy. Since there was a difference between NU and Masjumi in terms of the philosophy they espoused in which the former was more affected by Javanese traditionalism while the latter was informed by modernism as well as Islam, there were people among the Masjumis who even accused NU politics of awarding the mentioned title to the President as a political opportunism.

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1 President Soekarno was not the president of an Islamic State. Because the president has decisions relating to issues of religious life, then he should be recognized and validated by Muslims so that his decisions is legitimate seen from Islamic perspective. A “penghulu”, i.e. an officer of the Ministry of Religious Affair, who was appointed by the State must be valid according to Islam when he married two Muslim couples. He was appointed by the lower officer of the Ministry, and the officer was appointed by the Minister who was appointed by the President. All this officers should be regarded legitimate from Islam perspective. So, the “penghulu” is islamically legitimate when he marry the Muslim couples.
Different political struggle was actually done outside the official political stage. The idea of Islamic state was raised for the first time by Kartosuwirjo who declared the formation of “Darul Islam” (DI: literally means the house of Islam). Because of that Kartosuwirjo was regarded as rebelling to the existing government. Although his formation of DI was resulted from his disappointment with the political decision of “Renville Agreement” between the Dutch and Indonesian government which submitted all parts of Indonesian territory to the Dutch with the exception of Yogyakarta, Central Java and Sumatra, he then established Indonesian Islamic State (NII) and its army. With the results of “Renville Agreement”, the Indonesian army in the area of West Java should move to an area of Yogyakarta, which became the capital of Indonesia. This ruling certainly included moving the militia, such as Hezbollah, led by Kartosuwirjo. What is important with the presence of DI is that it began to raise Islamism or even radicalism. Why Islamism because DI carried out a message for establishing an Islamic State. On the other hand, the presence of Kartosuwirjo with his DI showed his radicalism, where he believed that there was an obligation to seize power to establish an Islamic State (See Turmudietall, 2014).

The political situation in the second half of the 1940s was filled with turmoil. Starting with the competition between Islamists and nationalists as well as followers of other religions in defining ideology of the state and the return of the Dutch to Indonesian territory after Japan's armed forces was defeated by the allies, the political turmoil that emerged was marked by conflict between groups, including that of political parties, and even among groups in Islamic societies. This is exacerbated by the rise of the Indonesian Communist rebellion in Madiun in 1948 and DI uprising led Kartosuwirjo. The bearers of Islamism sought to bring Indonesia to the direction they aspire in line with that conceived by Islam as they understood. In this case they did not want Indonesia fell into a Communist state, as they also did not want the nationalists to dominate in coloring Indonesia. They also couldn’t receive the NII established by Kartosuwirjo in exile.

Despite their conflicts2, the existence of Masjumi and NU Party during the period of liberal democracy showed not only a strong inclination or orientation to support political Islam but on the other hand also indicated a strong ideological leaning of Indonesian Islamic community. The strength of political Islam was indicated by the acquisition of Islamic parties that was comparable with that of nationalist party, accounting for about 43 percent share of the votes in the 1955 elections. However, the New Order government, that reigned the country after the fall of Soekarno, was apparently unhappy with the strength of Islamic parties. Through the security forces and supporters of government’s political party (Golkar), the current rulers was to intimidate supporters of Partai NU during 1971 election. Of the four major parties that existed in the 1950s, it was only NU party participating in the 1971 election, since the other major parties, namely Masjumi and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were already dissolved. What was interesting was that NU party received a bigger vote than that obtained in the 1955 election – even though not significant – despite intimidation received by its supporters.

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2 Geertz (1965) describes vividly about the conflict between devout Muslim affiliated with Islamic party and the less devout affiliated with secular party. In a village, a supporter of PNI died. PNI was the secular party influenced well by Javanism. Typically, the official who buried the dead was a devout Muslim. Because the dead was less Devout or even just nominal Muslim affiliated with non-Islamic party, then the officer did not come to bury the dead. Although the incident was somewhat surprising those who attended the burial of the dead, that was what happened because of strong ideological leaning and of strong political attachment to Islamic party.
The concerns of Suharto with political Islam culminated with his discretion to apply a policy of “Azas Tunggal” in 1984 that forced all organizations, including religious organizations, to use Pancasila as their ideological base. In the past, namely in 1976, President Suharto also issued a policy of “floating mass”, which has cut support from grassroots people to Islamic political party, because with this policy the grassroots participate in politics only once every five years, i.e. during the election period. By these two policies Suharto succeeded in cutting off Muslim support for Islamic political party, so that in the 1998 elections the Islamic party of PPP obtained only 22.43% of the national vote share, while Golkar Party, Suharto’s political machine got 74.51% vote share. The Nationalist party, the PDI received only 3.06 % share of the votes.

Suharto attempts to downplay and marginalize political Islam was successful. Nonetheless, the spirit to animate political Islam was still great. Therefore, when Suharto fell from the presidency and democratization was done, advocates of political Islam then established Islamic political parties. Of the 48 political parties taking part in the 1999 election, 18 of which were Islamic party. The presence of Islamic parties in the euphoria of democracy was as though they revived ideological tendencies that existed in the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s. The idea of shari’a implementation is restored and the rivalry between Islamist and nationalist parties was inevitable to happen. This situation had led to ideas of Islamism and even of establishing an Islamic state resurfaced. Many of the regulations at the local level, for example, were then given the attribute of Shari’a.

Outside the spirit of supporting political Islam, there are people or groups with extremist views in the Islamic community. With the name of Islam or because of excessive understanding of the teachings of Islam, they conducted terrorism. Several bombings have been carried out by these extreme people, ranging from the bombings in Bali, Hotel Marriot to that at the Australian embassy. Even the suicide bombing was carried out by a young Muslim. So, in the midst of re-emergence of Islamism which is facilitated by the democratization process undertaken by the Indonesian nation, there are Muslims with radicalism in mind whose action was blamed by the Muslim community in general. In the midst of this spirit of Islamism, Islamic leaders are trying to reassess the boundaries of reasonable political struggle of Islam. The attitudes of tolerant and accommodative have been shown by some Islamic leaders and then they are propagandizing Islam as “rahmatanlilalamin” (a mercy to all the worlds) as mentioned in the teachings of Islam, and it also marks the difference between the proponents of Islamism and those who fall into radicalism.

**Ideologization of Islam**

Religious awareness of Indonesian Islamic community developed and more visible after political reforms was carried out in 1998. This development is characterized by the increase in their religious piety, as evidenced by the increasing number of people praying in a mosque or the increase in Muslim use of Islamic symbols, such as wearing the hijab (Turmudi, 2015), in addition to the use of Islamic vocabulary in their daily lives. It could be said that on the early part of the second millennium, Islam in Indonesia is experiencing a significant development, in which socially it is practiced by most people. If in the 1970s mosques and religious gatherings were attended only by the elderly, it is now the young and the educated who enliven the religious activities in mosques. This means that the spirit to practice Islam in real life is very prominent among educated youth.
With the increase in piety it is assumed that the support for political Islam will also increase, given this piety will not only raise Muslim religiosity but also encourage them to implement Islamic concepts, including developing political Islam. Roberton and Chirico (1985) have discussed about this symptom of religion revivalism. They suggested their opposition to secularization thesis, because in the current development the modern people did not become secular, but in many cases become religious. Habermas (2008) later calls this tendency with the term post-secularism.

The above social symptoms seem to confirm and reinforce the scholar assumptions regarding trends of post-secularism that hit modern societies. Therefore, it is not surprising that with their spirit of Islam many Muslim leaders, who want to fight for their religion, deem Islamic political party as the most obvious and powerful media. The presence of these Islamic parties - once again it should be emphasized - is related to the increase in religious awareness and piety beside as a sign of the strengthening of Islamism in the life of the Indonesian nation. The spirit of Islamism, that resurfaced after the political reforms were carried out, have spawned dozens of parties formed by various groups with 18 of them were Islamic party participating in the 1999 election, whereas during the New Order’s reign it was only one Islamic of the three existing political parties.

The strengthening of the spirit of Islamism in Indonesia is indeed understandable. The openness of Indonesian people and their willingness to communicate with other nations, especially the Islamic community in the Middle East, eventually gave birth to new Islamic groups that even trans-national in character. These groups have managed to strengthen the spirit of Islamism and increase a piety of Islamic community here. Moreover, these groups also reinforce the tendency of developing Islamism that fluctuated among activists and Muslim leaders. So, in addition to strengthening the spirit of religiousness or their clustering, the presence of trans-nationalist organizations makes the Indonesian Islamic community confronted with new ideologies which on the other hand has broken them down as one umma (society) or strengthened their differences as diverse sub-groups of Islam.

Wahhabism has a dominant influence on national and trans-national organizations in Indonesia today. Wahhabism has long been embraced by some Muslims in Indonesia, but its influence or its propaganda was more intense after the coming of international organizations or the Islamic movement in the last 20 years. The influence of Wahhabism is noteworthy not only because it compete with that of the Shi’ite developing in the last 10 years, but it is also associated with Islamism due to its rigid religious understanding which tends to emphasize the need to develop Islamic politics. So, the presence of Wahhabism and later Shi’ite will not only strengthen Islamism but also generate new conflicts with the AhlSunnawa al-jama’a (The Sunni), because the former are not just rigid in interpreting the teachings of Islam but also intolerant of differences. The ideologization of Islam in society is more strongly conducted by the adherents of these two notions, arousing exclusiveness among groups of Muslim. Even in extreme cases, they also do takfir (regarded the other Muslims who have different stand or thoughts as infidel), causing division among Muslims wider (Tibbi, 2014).

The criticism or attack carried out by the proponents of trans-national organizations has not only caused their mission with regard to the strengthening
of Islamism, especially the establishment of the Islamic state, or caliphate, not accepted by the people of Indonesia but also invites a reaction from the latter. The Indonesian Sunni also arise by conducting various activities of quasi-sufism and many religious leaders catapult responses of resistance to efforts of Wahhabization or Islamism. The NU ulama explicitly strengthen the locality of Indonesian Islam and even they suggest strongly that Indonesian Muslim community not need to establish an Islamic state, which lately have become the topic hurled especially by the Islamists.

With the reality as described above, it can be said that the increasing religiosity of Indonesian Muslims, which is often interpreted as the rise of Islam, could be interpreted as a milestone in the progress and development of Islam in which this religion is practiced more strongly by its followers, an indication that their piety is also increasing. But on the other hand, this does not necessarily mean that the rise of Islam is in line with the strengthening of Islamism. In other words, assuming that the more virtuous a person the more fittest he is in making Islam as the foundation of his lives is not entirely correct, because in this instance he does not require that Islam be used as the basis of statehood. In this case their piety is just directing him to practice Islam correctly, following all its teachings. So it is clear that the trend occurring in Indonesian Muslim community is different from the tendency of the adherents of radicalism that requires political life to be based on Islam.

I need to emphasize that this trend is very different from what happened 30 years ago in which the pious community’s affiliation with Islamic party is strong. My research in the area of East Java reveals that the pious Muslims supported only the Islamic party (PPP). This trend has also been sustained by a fatwa of ulama who obliged Muslims to vote for Islamic party. Although this obligation in the perspective of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) does not mean absolute since other ulama could give another opinion, the obligations issued by this fatwa has led devout Muslims to vote for the Islamic party (see Turmudi, 1995). There is a sense of sinful in society if they do not follow the fatwa. A split among follower of a sufi order, i.e Qadiriyyah wan Naqsyabandiyah, is an example of how support for political Islam is considered as a liability (Turmudi, 1998). However, the tendency happening now, as seen from the decline in the acquisition of the Islamic party, represents a shift in terms of affinity of Islamic society against Islamic parties or their sentiment to support political Islam, signifying the shift of Islamism.

**Islamism Reappraisal**

The final goal of the movement supporting Islamism is the formation of an Islamic State or Islamic caliphate. Although the spirit of Islamism was strengthened with respect to the spirit of resistance of Muslims in the Middle East against the dominance or even the invasion of the West against Islamic countries, Islamism in the sense intended by Tibbi (2012) is not limited to such opposition and not solely triggered by resistance to Western dominance, as was the case in Indonesia. Islamism in this sense is the result of the interpretation of its holder on the existing teachings of Islam. Therefore, in Indonesia, for example, Islamism has emerged since Indonesia gained its independence from the Dutch and Japan. In most Islamic societies there is a desire to expand the area of influence of Islam as a religion to other areas of life and politics is used as a medium to realize that desire. This is why Islamism emerged in different countries populated by Muslims, including Indonesia. In the most extreme
forms, Islamism give birth to radicalism when the resistance against the West invasion, such as that happening in the Middle East, cannot be done physically or when political life situations is considered incompatible with the demands of Islam.

The presence of trans-national organizations, such as Hizbuttahtir Indonesia, has been used as a medium to spread Islamism. This organization expressly voices the ideals of the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. This passion is driven by their understanding on the importance of establishing an Islamic State as it is conceived in Islamic teachings. This construction is a necessity because the existing state is not the Islamic State, so that people have to change it through jihad or war against the kafir (unbelievers) who control the state. Kafir here can be defined as a person who embraces any religion other than Islam or those Muslims who do not observe the law of Islam. As such, the implementers of state or government who do not base on Islamic law are also included in the category of kafir.

The two concepts of the State of Islam and jihad, are important to note, constituting the subject in the discourse of political Islam in general. Those who hold or adherents of Islamism see the establishment of the Islamic State as a must, and those who ignore it are regarded as disobeying the law or the provisions mentioned in the sources of Islamic teachings. Furthermore they even mention the necessity to fight those who are reluctant to establish the Islamic State. Kartosuwirjo is the first who considered the need for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Regardless of his disappointment with the outcome of “Renville Agreement”, Kartosuwirjo explicitly stated that Muslims are obliged to establish an Islamic state. He said that the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and the implementation of Islamic Shari’a should be done through jihad (war) by taking leadership of the state from people who do not care about the shari’a and Muslim Community. He stated further that the government not taking the law of God shall be fought, so that jihad (in the sense of war) becomes fardlu ‘ain (absolute obligation) for Muslims.

This kind of thoughts gets its place with the presence of trans-national organizations who even want to establish the Islamic caliphate. The joining of some prominent figures of Islam in the international organizations and establish a network of Jama’ahIslamiyah for Southeast Asia region, has led to former radical ideas as that proposed by Kartosuwirjo revived and spread even to young people. Thus, thoughts about the obligations to establish an Islamic state is not only strengthened again - even if only on a small part of Islamic leaders - but also they even add it with a menace for those who are ignorant by classifying them askafir (pagan) or musyrik (idolatrous). What is also important from Kartosuwirjo’s perspective is that the secular government that runs Indonesia is considered as thogut (satan) that should be combated.

The extreme idea to establish the Islamic State is now only possessed by a minority of Muslims in Indonesia. Islamic political parties also do not list or intend to establish an Islamic state as their political targets. What they pursue is the creation of an Islamic life, in which Islamic shari’a is implemented. Islamic leaders need political decisions to realize such an implementation, since the state then - although it is not Islamic - has an obligation to provide support or to implement the political decisions. Even though it is not extreme, such a view has, once again, declined significantly. Political parties had replaced Islam as its ideology with Pancasila, so that they
become an open party and no longer Islamic. This change was formerly begun when Suharto introduced a policy of “Azas Tunggal”, forcing all organizations to use Pancasila as their ideological base, but now the change to become an open party is done voluntarily.

The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), used to be an Islamic political party, has initiated or pioneered such changes when its congress in 1984 decided to change the base of this organization with Pancasila and even revitalized Pancasila as the state ideology. The acceptance of Pancasila by stating that it was final ideology for Indonesian state is important because with that NU asked all elements of the nation to no longer think to establish an Islamic state. In this case Islam should not replace the State ideology and at the same time should not serve as the State ideology. Although the process was long, this change in view or political stance was followed by pious society affiliated to NU. The decision is then used as the basis for political activity of NU members later, as NU itself does not prohibit its members from affiliating with political party.

This paradigmatic change in the politics of Islam is indeed done through a long process. NU itself used to be very strongly to play in what is called political Islam. Experience teaches that politics is the terrain or the medium in which the message of Islam could be realized and brought to the public at the same time. Furthermore, experience teaches that Muslim disunity is also due to their political game. Thus, leaving practical politics is an attempt to save the umma from the split. Placing politics as a profane world occurred when NU explicitly allowed its followers to be affiliated to any political party. This assertion is important because NU as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia had long been engaged in the political struggle of Islam, until it dissociated from the Islamic party of PPP in 1984. Furthermore, NU and several other Islamic organizations are trying to put Islam as a religion to be practiced by its adherents, neutral from any political interests.

If Islamism is related to efforts to make Islam as a political ideology that aspires to establish an Islamic state, then the NU’s decision to get out of practical politics in 1984 and strong intention to keep hold of Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the State could be said to be out of Islamism. This is one case that is made through a formal decision of the organization. At the level of society, attitudes that show the loosening of Islamism did happen smoothly, as seen from the changes in their voting behavior. In addition, it is important to note that the desire to establish an Islamic state actually never existed in themselves. Several factors may affect these changes. What is clear is that their political affiliation or their support for political parties in the election is based on a rational choice. They do not choose an Islamic party, simply because the party may be less favorable. This is a simplification, but religious considerations in determining what party should be voted for in the election seems to have greatly decreased. The ulamawho used to be a vote getter for Islamic party whom people at the grassroots level sought political advice are now affiliating even with various secular political parties.

Another factor that led to declining public support for Islamism or political Islam is the fact that many exponent of Islamic parties did not behave as that idealized by Islam, in which human perfection was expressed in their moral strength. In many cases, the politicians from Islamic parties were involved in corruption and put in jail. This fact led to the decrease in public trust towards Islamic party, since the struggle to sustain Islam and the Umma cannot be done by people who are immoral. Because of such
cases, the Islamic party is tantamount to non-Islamic or secular party. Lack of sympathy against Islamist politicians have at least reinforced the tendency of people not to support political Islam that has grown quite long. It must be said that there is no single factor contributing to the decrease in political Islam in general, but I can speculate that the decrease in morality among Islamic politicians is an important factor.

**Concluding Remarks**

It could be said that the Islamic parties in the 1950s like Masjumi and Partai NU were Islamist in terms of their orientation, in which their ideological base was Islam, but they did not oppose or seek to change the state ideology, Pancasila, with Islam. Political orientation of the parties that existed by that time varied and they even competed with each other for the lead. The four existing parties were Masjumi and Partai NU with Islam as their ideological base, PNI with nationalism as its ideology, and the Indonesian Communist Party with the ideology of communism. President Sukarno had tried to accommodate or allowed various parties with diverse “ideology”, because their ideological orientation did not threaten the state ideology. In this case the orientation of the Islamic party, for example, was not directed to establish an Islamic state. Sukarno saw it as a reality that must be accepted, so he later suggested NASAKOM jargon, an abbreviation of Nationalism, Religion and Communism that must coexist in Indonesian politics.

The effort of strengthening and reaffirmation of Pancasila as the state ideology was carried largely by the Suharto regime after the Communist party failed to seize state power through a coup. Events of September 30 in 1965 in which seven generals were killed by the communist party cadres has led this party to be banned, because they would seize power and make Indonesia as a communist state. Suharto who replaced Sukarno was the army’s general who was very anti-Communist and sought to establish or reinforce the Pancasila as the state ideology. Efforts of protrusion of Pancasila as the state ideology was carried out in such a way so that during Suharto reigned the country from 1968-1998, a lot of people of Indonesia, especially intellectuals, were allergic enough to hear the word of Pancasila.

Although it was impressed as forced by the situation, NU as a religious social organization had accepted Pancasila as their basic ideology and even declared in 1984 that Pancasila as a state ideology must be accepted by all members of the community or the people of Indonesia. NU that was once a political party smelled the symptoms of imposing Islam by certain groups, like the Darul Islam group, to serve as the state ideology by establishing the Islamic State. Despite the cynical attitude addressed by people who were allergic to hear the word “Pancasila”, NU confirmed that Pancasila is final as the ideology of the State and must be accepted since Indonesia is a plural country in terms of its people’s adherence to religion.

The acceptance of Pancasila as the State ideology was strengthened and cynicism of those against Pancasila faded after political reforms conducted in 1998 in which various new groups emerged with diverse ideological orientation. What is quite significant of these changes is the emergence of groups of hardliner Islamists who not only wants to establish an Islamic state but a fraction of them did terrorism, such as the Bali bombing, the bombing of the Australian embassy, of the Marriott Hotel and others. Almost all the circles in society asserted that the state ideology of Pancasila is suitable
for a pluralistic Indonesian nation. So, it may be suggested that despite the increase in Islamic passion following the political reforms in 1998, on the other hand, the passion of Islamism movement was decreased, as seen from the lack of popularity of Islamic parties.

Amid strong passion to implement Islam as shown by the increasing number of people practicing Islam piously, political Islamism has no strong influence on society. Old Islamic parties, such as Masjumi, failed to instill its Islamist orientation to a new generation who now spread in various parties. Their successors have come out of Islamism that enveloped their parents when leading these parties. The new Islamic party, which is actually somewhat popular as PKS (the Justice and Prosperous Party) also even changed its ideology and became an open party where the party is no longer Islamic. Now it is just one party (PPP) that still holds Islam as its ideological base, with no significant support from Islamic community.

A trend that occurred in Indonesia now is the birth of what is called post-Islamism. The birth of this movement does not mean that its initiators are out of Islamic passion but instead their tendency to fight for Islamic politics is reduced. In this case Islam is not used as an ideology with which they do shari’aization of life. The exponent of movement no longer fight for everything smelled of Islam, not to mention for political Islam. They are fighting for the common religious ideas such as justice and welfare which constitute a common topic. This trend of less attachment to Islam seem at odds with the reality that Islamic societies today tend to be more religious in practicing Islam.

Movements that smelled Islamists in Indonesia are actually supported only by a small portion of the community. Islamic political parties, such as the PKS (justice and Prosperous Party), which may aspire Islamization through the establishment of the Islamic State, also no longer inclined to Islamism. Even with the current development, the party has also become an open party, and no longer the Islamic party, where few of its exponents also came from other religions. These changes could be due to the realization that Islamic political parties never got majority support, being left by their Muslim supporters. In can be said then that amid growing religiosity of the Islamic community in the sense of practicing Islam as a whole and strongly, Islamism is not an option as shown by the decline in support for the Islamic parties. Muslims’ support for the PKB, for example, is not because the party is struggling for Islam, but rather because this party is established by their primordial organization.

Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that the phenomenon of the decline of Islamism is a common phenomenon that occurs in many countries in the Middle East, including the country claiming to be Islamic. Bayat (2013), for example, provides an overview of the current trends with what is happening in Iran, where Islam is no longer used as an ideology by the activists and the general public, but rather as a source of value. The teachings of Islam, such as the eradication of poverty, are carried out in action. Bayat then call this tendency as post-Islamism. Nevertheless, it still needs to be monitored that regardless of less support for Islamism by the Islamic community, there is a minority of people who want to keep fighting for the establishment of Islamic State. Radicalism that is driven by the ideas of the Islamic State as a result of their interpretation on Islamic teachings has been instilled by militant cadres even to the educated youth. A former activist of NII said that all secular campuses in Jakarta and other cities have been infiltrated by militants NII cadres. This could mean that among the young
educated there are some people who have radical ideologies. They are still silent, but it is assumed that if the situation in Indonesia is squeezing their life and people in general, they will commit acts of violence in the name of Islam. In other words, apart from the declining tendency of Islamism, on the other hand radicalism that is resulted from extreme Islamism will continue to haunt the political life of the nation after the adherents of Islamism is defeated in their politics.

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