The Language of Religious Tolerance and Political Publicity Approaching the Gubernatorial Election of DKI Jakarta in the Social Media

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Abstract

The upcoming gubernatorial election of Jakarta province (pilkada) in 2017 can arguably be perceived as the arena where the scrutiny of the relationship between (religious) majority and minority groups controversially takes place. In the stage of constructing the positive political image of the candidate, the supporters/volunteers at the same time counter, criticize and contest the political image the opponents' construct. One of the supporters/volunteers who perpetually demonstrate their faithful support for the incumbent governor is Jasmev (Jokowi Ahok Media Volunteer). Deploying Hallidayian transitivity system, this paper focuses on the language Jasmev employed in the constructing Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's (Ahok) image and contesting the opponents' image in the Facebook. They position Ahok as the most suitable candidate that is believed capable in accelerating the urban and city development of Jakarta. Ahok is also framed in the language that purportedly exhibits religious tolerance, social equity and equality, clean and accountable governance. The data were taken since the moment Ahok declared himself as the candidate up to September 2016. It was found that the language they deployed lies in the obscurity of the negative and black campaign, especially when they contest the political image of their opponents.

Keywords: *Pilkada DKI, Jasmev, Transitivity System, Religious Tolerance, Political Publicity.*

Abstrak

Pilkada DKI Jakarta tahun 2017 dapat dipandang sebagai arena contoh analisis hubungan antara kelompok (keagamaan) mayoritas dengan minoritas yang terjadi secara kontroversial. Pada tahapan pengonstruksian citra politik positif kandidat, para pendukung/relawan di saat yang bersamaan mengkritik dan mempertarungkan citra politik kandidat lawan. Salah satu kelompok pendukung/relawan yang secara terus menerus mendemonstrasikan dukungan setia mereka terhadap gubrenur pertahana yakni Jasmev (Jokowi Ahok Media Volunteer). Dengan menggunakan sistem transitivitas yang dikembangkan Halliday, fokus tulisan ini ini adalah pada bahasa yang digunakan Jasmev dalam mengonstruksikan citra Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) sekaligus mempertarungkannya citra lawan politik Ahok di Facebook. Mereka memosisikan Ahok sebagai kandidat yang paling tepat yang dipercaya dapat mengakselerasi perkembangan urban kota Jakarta. Citra Ahok juga dibingkai dalam bahasa yang terlihat mempertontonkan toleransi keagamaan, keadilan sosial, pemerintahan yang bersih dan akuntabel. Data diambil dari saat Ahok mendeklarasikan dirinya sebagai kandidat hingga bulan Sepetember 2016. Ditemukan bahwa bahasa yang mereka gunakan berada dalam kekaburan kampanye hitam dan negatif, terutama ketika mereka mempertarungkan citra politik kandidat lawan.

Kata kunci: *Pilkada DKI, Jasmev, Sistem Transitivitas, Toleransi Agama, Publisitas Politik.*

Introduction

The upcoming Gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in 2017 can arguably be perceived as the perpetual arena of the ideological contestation of the historical polarisation of the so called nationalist and Islamic-based political strands (Leiliyanti, 2013). This contestation takes place, in the lens of Mujani and Liddle (2009, pp. 575-590), not under Pancasila-based democracy, but "Muslim's Indonesia Secular Democracy". They argue that this derives from their finding that the Indonesia's political system has been predominantly governed by secular political parties and secular politicians. The characteristic of Indonesian electorates (57% secular, 33% Islamist) itself also constitutes significantly as the determining factor of their rationalisation of this democracy model. This was based on Mujani and Liddle's (2009, pp. 589-591) survey which was conducted in 2007. They also found that the aforementioned percentage remained constant in 2009.

In alignment with Mujani and Liddle, Aspinall (2010, pp. 31-32) contends that superficial Islamisation occurs within this model by way of coopting "the Islamic political forces" and blunting "the Islamic goals by integrating these forces into the system of patronage-based democracy and compelling them to compete for votes from a public that values performance more than piety". This, Aspinall continues, is perceived as the "early-stages of a long-term incremental struggle to Islamise the state from within", where "the gradual erosion of pluralism" has been taking place. Within this light, we argue that the political nuance of the upcoming gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta will resemble the patronage-based democracy where the nationalist and Islamic political forces are contested, but not in a perfect symmetrical analogous form of the 2012 gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta. The

attempt to Islamise the Jakartans and the constesting the ideology and practices may also arguably be taken place, mostly likely from the ones who gain the Islamic-based support. However, as this paper concentrates on the language of the supporters/volunteers representing the nationalist strand, we argue that such notion most possibly lies on the opposite pole, i.e. disparaging it.

Three pairs of candidates (the incumbent Governor and Vice Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) – Saiful Djarot; the former Minister of Education and Culture in Jokowi's administration, Anies Baswedan – Sandiago Uno, the distant relative of the former DKI Governor in 2007-2012, Fauzi Bowo; Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the former President (2004-2014), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)'s son and Sylviana Murni, the former Deputy Governor for tourism and culture of DKI Jakarta) are now in the contested arena for the capital's top seat in the Jakarta administration office. Ahok – Saiful Djarot are nominated by the nationalist parties of Golkar, PDI-P, Hanura, and Nasdem, Anies Baswedan – Sandiago Uno are nominated by the so called Islamist party, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS), and the nationalist party, Gerindra, whilst Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono – Sylviana Murni are nominated by the nationalist party, *Partai Demokrat* (PD), the nationalist Islamic-based parties, *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB) and the Islamic party, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP). From the supporting parties composition, it is self-explanatory that the patronage-based system operates behind their candidacies. All the mass media reports indicate that Ahok – Djarot represents the Megawati's camp, Anies – Uno represents Prabowo's camp, whilst Agus-Sylviana represents SBY's camp.

If we take a closer look at this patronage-based system, it can be overtly

seen that the historical polarisation between nationalist/Islamic strands proliferate almost in a symmetrical form like in the 2014 Presidential Election, where the contestation between "the oligarchic machine politics [Prabowo's camp] and grassroots volunteerism [Jokowi's camp]" (Mietzner, 2014, pp. 111-125) took place. They both amplified the sensitive and controversial issues of religion, ethnicity, class, and nationalism.

This politicking model arguably commenced and became the media spotlight, especially in the 2012 gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta. Prior to his presidency, Jokowi and Ahok were the Governor and Vice Governor of DKI Jakarta for two years. Altmeyer (2014, pp. 121-132) argues that the key elements in Jokowi and Ahok's victory lied on the counter strategies of the opponents (Fauzi Bowo (also known as Foke) – Nachrowi Ramli) , i.e. "the staged media events" and "the strongman tactics". The latter, Mietzner (2014, p. 113) would have probably argued, analogous to Prabowo. Conversely, Jokowi – Ahok, Altmeyer continues, deployed the "face to face campaigning with a marketing technique aimed at capturing media attention". Altmeyer also notes down that although both camps claimed to suffer from the black campaign (i.e. "discriminatory, illegal ... morally dubious strategies, such as defamation, falsehoods and personal attacks" (Altmeter, 2014, p. 121)), she perceives Foke – Nara's campaining as "more obvious, widespread, and often particularly nasty [in black campaining]" compared to their opponent. The black campaign itself in the 2012 gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta cemented the sharp polarisations of religion and ethnicity.

The 2012 Gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta was marked as the embryonic contested arena of Jokowi – Ahok's image (Leiliyanti, Diyantari, and Muchtar, forthcoming) by way of deploying the grassroots volunteers, comprising of young professionals, students, activists, Muslim and non Muslim religious figures (Mietzner, 2014, p. 119) to construct their image and create the brand (read: image) awareness of Jokowi – Ahok. One of the volunteer's groups that shows that its faithful support towards Jokowi – Ahok (also read: Ahok – Djarot) is Jasmev (Jokowi Ahok Media Volunteers). In the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla (JK), deployed this group as their electoral machine, especially in the cyber world, in contructing, criticising and contesting the opponent's image and mobilising public opinions. The products of this machine in the virtual world in Lim's (2013, p. 636) lens represent the everyday political/cultural practices in the form of "light package, headline appetite, trailer vision". This group altered the abbreviation of Jasmev into Jokowi Advanced Social Media Volunteers at the 2014 Presidential election. However, for the upcoming gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in 2017, Jasmev proliferates itself in discrepant faces, such as Jasmev 2017 and *Teman Ahok*. In addition, prior to the official reactivation of Jasmev, Kartika Djoemadi, the one of founders of Jasmev, affirmed that Jasmev members help *Teman Ahok* in collecting one million ID cards of the Jakartans, especially when Ahok declared that he would nominate himself independently without the political parties affiliation. Ahok eventually chose the dependent path.

Mietzner further notes that the members of Jokowi's volunteers (read also: Jasmev/Teman Ahok) are clustered into several tasks: promoting the candidates on social media, organising the support networks, building on social approach to the public and maintaining the social communication and interaction with the public. In doing so, Tempo online (https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/05/27/083774604/ahok-

resmi-cagub-kartika-djoemadi-barulah-jasmev-gas-pol) reports that they claim gathering valid and reliable issues and data pertaining Ahok's achievement, such as Krukut river condition (before and after) for the campaign.

Ahok's image as the first Christian Sino-Indonesian that successfully become DKI Jakarta Governor has been closedly related to the issues of religiosity and governance. In the religious issue, Ahok has been intractably assailed for his contentious actions, such as the (alleged) planning in demolishing mosques, such Mesjid Luar Batang, Mesjid Baitul Arif, the alleged ban of "*takbir keliling*" and his actions in donating two cows during Islamic feast day of Eid Al-Adha for Mesjid Luar batang, and the catering of beer (the icumbent perceived beer not as liquor though it contains 5% alcohol – the illegitimate beverage for Muslims, http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2016/05/26/06463791/ahok.bir.itu.alkohol.di.bawah.5.persen.bukan.miras) during *Teman Ahok* and Ahok's dinner meeting at the incumbent residence. However, at the same time Ahok was noted as the Governor who executed the initiation plan of the two previous Governors, Jokowi and Fauzi Bowo to build Fatahillah mosque, in the city hall complex. Ahok perceived Masjid Fatahillah as the symbol of his attempt in realising Jokowi's dream of having a mosque inside the city hall complex (http://news.liputan6.com/read/2423938/ahok-membangun-masjid-impian-jokowi and http://news.liputan6.com/read/2423974/masjid-fatahillah-digagas-jokowi-diwujudkan-ahok). In this sense, we cannot perceive this mosque as Ahok's attempt to win the heart of Muslim voters in general. He merely demonstrates on this stage his obedience to his patron.

For the governance issues, Ahok was allegedly involved in Sumber Waras case (the case where DKI governement was allegedly accused of conducting mark up in buying the land for Sumber Waras hospital), *Pulau* G Reclamation (the case where Teman Ahok was allegedly received 30 billion rupiah from the reclamation developers, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/06/16/kpk-to-probe-allegation-that-teman-ahok-received-funding-from-reclamation-developers.html), his perennial dispute with DPRD DKI, and his controversial movements in relocating/evicting (?) the Jakartans who live in the prohibited areas (the open green area and the riverside areas), such as Rawajati, Kampung pulo, Bukit Duri. However, Ahok is also known for his actions in continuing his predecessor programs as he states that not only does Masjid Fatahillah become the symbol of his attempt in in realising Jokowi's dream of having a mosque inside the city hall complex, but that also other policies he made represent the cultivation of Jokowi's former programs (http://news.liputan6.com/read/2423938/ahok-membangun-masjid-impian-jokowi). The predecessor programs were, such as *Kartu Jakarta Pintar*, *Kartu Jakarta Sehat*, discplining the DKI civil servants, "*lelang jabatan*" (public auction for the bureaucratic position of the Jakarta administration office), relocation/eviction (?) of people who live in the prohibited areas to the subsidised flats.

Referring back to the notion of patron, Djoemadi, one of the founders and coordinators of Jasmev, contends that on the Wednesday's meeting (22 July 2016) with Jokowi, Jokowi asked his former volunterrs/supporters implicitly to support Ahok for the 2017 Gubernatorial Election (http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2016/06/24/22213851/jasmev.secara.implisit.jokowi.nyatakan.pilihan.untuk.dukung.ahok.sudah.benar), a claim that was rebutted by Mohammad Yamin, the chairperson of *Sekretariat Nasional*, (http://nasional.harianterbit.com/nasional/2016/06/26/64662/25/25/Klarifikasi-Jokowi-Seputar-Klaim-Jasmev-Relawan-Dukung-Ahok) in the aftermath

of his meeting with Jokowi with 4 other Jokowi's supporter/volunteer groups (*Barisan Relawan Jokowi; Kebangkitan Indonesia Baru; Jokowi Mania; Relawan Penggerak Indonesia Baru*). However, at the same time, Bhakti (2016, September 21, p. 6) notes that it was Jokowi's initiative to mediate Ahok with PDI-P (in this case Megawati Soekarnoputri – the chairperson of PDI-P), especially when Ahok is perceived as an arrogant figure by the other PDI-P cadres. Ahok is also perceived by PDI-P as a political figure who has a negative political reputation for his pragmatism and politic-of-divide maneuver (http://megapolitan. kompas.com/read/2016/08/22/07121981/ menunggu.keputusan.megawati.untuk. jakarta). After two-time-meetings with Megawati, PDI-P decided to nominate Ahok as its candidate.

Methodology

This preliminary research aims at investigating the language Ahok – Djarot's supporters/volunteers (Jasmev2017/ Teman Ahok) in constructing and contesting their candidates' image, especially Ahok, and the opponents' image. Judgement sampling was deployed to collect the data (meme) taken from their posting on Facebook prior to the official reactivation of Jasmev 2017 to September 2016. The memes pertaining the issue of religiosity and leadership were chosen to analyse the linguistic and cultural scopes the supporters/volunteers used in constructing and contesting the image of the candidates. Hallidayian transitivity system was deployed to scrutinise their written expressions on the meme, whilst the social semiotics developed by Kress, and van Leeuwen was employed to analyse the visual texts.

The linguistic analysis of the written expressions were conducted by deploying the table of structure analysis based on the transitivity system posited by M.A.K. Halliday. As a mean of communication, language, especially its structure, in Hallidayian lens, carries three metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal and thematic. However, the focus of this textual analysis is on the ideational metafunction (for the written expressions), i.e. seeing the structure of the written texts as the system that represents the inner and outer experiences and at the same time the grey areas, i.e. the demarcation of inner and outer experiences of the sender of the meme's message. The interpersonal and thematic metafunctions are seen dispensable, especially in seeing the scope the written expressions of the memes deliver the intended political/cultural messages.

In the transivity system, the language structure represents six different processes (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, pp. 168-303): material process (representing the outer experience –the happening, the doing, and the creating), mental process (representing the inner experience – the process of sensing: emotion, cognition, perception), relational process (lies between the inner and outer experiences as it represents the state of being), verbal process (lies near to the material process, as this represents how the sayer convey his/her thoughts in the verbal action form), behavioural process (combines the material and mental processes, i.e.involvement physical movement as well as signifies the psychological state of the outer experience, such as in the clause "she secretly smiles"), and existential process (signified by the phrase "there is/ was/were/has been/have been/had been/ will be, and so on").

Developing Hallidayian perspective for the analytical tool for linguistic purposes, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006, p. 19), Hodge, and Kress (1988, p. 4) argue that the grammar of the written expressions is similar to the visual ones, as they both

share the same logonomic system, i.e. the "set of rules that prescribe the conditions for production and reception of meanings which specify who can claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive and understand) meanings about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why)". In this sense, analysing the written and visual texts at the same time goes parallel with the basic principles.

This paper merely concentrates on three memes as the sample of the analysis as the process of analysing the other memes is still on-going. This, definitely, becomes the paper's limitation, as the issues of governance, social equality and equity have not been covered.

Religiosity and Leadership

Kenapa orang membenci jokowi Dan ahok? Dulu saya pikir orang membenci ahok karena ahok nonmuslim, Tp jokowi yg Muslim pun dibenci juga..dulu saya pikir orang membenci jokowi karena jokowi orangnya kerempeng Dan tidak ganteng, Tp Ahok yg gagah Dan ganteng pun dibencinya juga..dulu saya pikir org membenci jokowi karena jokowi terlalu santun Dan terkesan kurang berani, Tp ahok yg tegas Dan blak2an apa adanya pun juga dibencinya..dulu saya pikir ahok di benci karena berasal Dari etnis cina, Tp jokowi yg berasal Dari jawa juga dibencinya.. ternyata eh ternyata.. Jokowi dan ahok punya kesamaan yg membuat sebagian orang jd membencinya..yaitu mereka pemimpin yang berintegritas, yang bekerja keras mengabdi untuk kemajuan indonesia..mereka pejabat diluar kebiasaan mayoritas pejabat Indonesia yang gemar korupsi, yang gemar berfoya foya Dan bergaya hidup mewah..sikap jokowi dan ahok itulah yang membuat sebagian orang jd membencinya..

(source: facebook)

No.	Conjunction	Clause	Ellipsis	Process
1		Kenapa orang membenci Jokowi dan AHOK? Senser process phenomenon		Mental
2		Dulu saya pikir orang membenci ahok, Cir senser pro phenomenon		Mental
3		orang membenci ahok Senser pro phenomenon		Mental
4	Karena	Ahok nonmuslim, Carrier attribute	[adalah] pro	Relational
5	Tapi	Jokowi yang Muslim pun dibenci juga.. phenomenon pro circumstance	[pembenci] senser	Relational
6		Dulu saya pikir orang membenci jokowi Cir senser pro phenomenon		Mental
7		orang membenci jokowi Senser pro phenomenon		Mental
8	Karena	Jokowi orangnya(sic.) kerempeng Dan tidak ganteng Carrier attribute	[itu] pro	Relational
9	Tp	Ahok yang gagah **dan** ganteng pun dibencinya Phenomenon pro senser juga.. cir		Mental
10		Dulu saya pikir orang membenci jokowi Cir senser pro phenomenon		Mental
11		orang membenci jokowi Senser pro phenomenon		Mental

No.	Conjunction	Clause	Ellipsis	Process
12	karena	jokowi terlalu santun, Carrier attribute	[adalah pro sosok yang] attribute	Relational
	Dan	terkesan kurang berani, pro phenomenon	[Jokowi] Phenomenon [orang yang mengesankan] Senser	Mental
13	Tp	Ahok yg tegas **dan** blak2an apa adanya pun Phenomenon dibencinya juga.. pro senser circumstance		Mental
14		Dulu saya pikir ahok dibenci Cir senser pro phenomenon		Mental
15		ahok di benci phenomenon pro	[pembenci] senser	Mental
16	Karena	Berasal **Dari** etnis cina, pro attribute	[Ahok] carrier	Relational
17	Tp	Jokowi yang berasal **dari** Jawa juga dibenci nya... Phenomenon cir pro senser		Mental
18		Ternyata eh ternyata...Jokowi dan ahok pu-nya carrier pro kesamaan yang membuat sebagian orang jd attribute membencinya..		Relational
19	Yaitu	mereka pemimpin yang berintegritas, yang bekerja carrier attribute keras mengabdi untuk kemajuan Indonesia..		Relational
20		Mereka pejabat di luar kebiasaan mayoritas pejabat Carrier attribute Indonesia yang gemar korupsi, yang gemar berfoya foya dan bergaya hidup mewah..	[adalah] Process	Relational
21		Sikap Jokowi dan Ahok itulah yang mem-buat sebagian Phenomenon process senser orang jd (sic.) membencinya..		Mental

From the total of 21 clauses in the meme above, it is found that 14 clauses (67%) representing the mental process (3 clauses using the word "think", whilst 11 clauses the word "hate") are deployed to convey the intended message. The 33% of relational process (7clauses) are employed to describe the state of being of the person attached to the attibutes given. The senser of "hate" (the mental process) itself is mostly described in the singular word ("orang"). The last clause specifies the senser into most of the haters. The senser "I" in the meme reflects the author. S/he is the one who is in the process of figuring out the underlying factor of the rationale the ones who dislike Ahok (read also: Jokowi). The attempt of deciphering the

factor is conducted by firstly constrating the image of Ahok (non Muslim, Chinese, handsome, dashing, bold, outspoken) with Jokowi (Muslim, Javanese, skinny, unattractive, polite, lackluster). However, as her/his second method, the author in the 18th clause directly jumped into conclusion by paralleling Jokowi and Ahok as the same entity (clean, dedicated, hard-working, simple) having all the positive attributes that negate the other typical officials in the language that arguably stigmatise the negative image ("*...mereka pejabat diluar kebiasaan mayoritas pejabat Indonesia yan gemar korupsi, yang gemar berfoya-foya Dan bergaya hidup mewah...*"). The contrast is firstly conducted by using the mental verb ("think") three times, whilst the other eleven uses the mental verb "hate". In this sense, the author attempts to accentuate the negative feeling of the detesting groups towards Ahok (read also: Jokowi) in order to instil and ossify the reversed connotation, i.e. the positive leadership image of Ahok (=Jokowi). The visual text in the meme which is located below the written text is aguably reinforced the image parallelism, i.e. Ahok and Jokowi are politically one inseparable entity. It can overtly seen in the visual text – how these two have a relax formal interaction (as Ahok dons uniform whilst Jokowi formal suit) with the gestures that indicate the behavioural process, i.e. as if they were having a joke during their meeting. However, the visual text fails to demonstrate the bold and outspoken characters of Ahok as well as their "clean" (read also: corruption-free – if not incorruptible) image.

Beside the image parallelism, stigmatisation of the negative opponents' image, and the ossification of Ahok's favourable image, a closer look on the meme also reveals that the frequent deployment of relational process in 7 clauses, especially the attributes, arguably indicate not only the quality of Ahok (=Jokowi), but also it demonstrates the

scope the notion of religiosity is depicted. The contradictory notions between Muslim versus non Muslim are framed in a way that it appears not as binary opposition per se, as the constrasting mode is aimed at ostensibly coalescing these opposite poles. By juxtaposing Jokowi's image and Ahok's image in one frame, starting on the 18th clause, the opposite qualities in Jokowi's and Ahok's attributes synthesise and form not only an integrity, but more importantly it represents the religious and cultural tolerance.

Nonetheless, the language of religious and cultural tolerance need to be re-examined as the clause 18 to 21 seem to positioning most of Indonesian officials negatively. The negative positioning is not synonymous with negative campaign, as the latter connotes the exposure (if not the publicity of) the negative sides of the candidates. On this meme, the clause ("*mereka pejabat diluar kebiasaan mayoritas pejabat Indonesia yang gemar korupsi, yang gemar berfoya foya Dan bergaya hidup mewah*") indicates not only the stigamatisation of negative attributes, but that as the meme also does not contain any indication of the data to justify the allegation, it can be argued that this meme evasively represents indirect black campaign, covertly aiming to the opposite camps.

The second image is the simplified version of the first meme:

(source: facebook)

No.	Conjunction	Clause	Ellipsis	Process
1		AHOK dibenci Phenomenon process	[senser]	Mental
2	karena	dia TIONGHOA, carrier attribute	[adalah] Pro	Relational
3	Tapi	JOKOWI yang PRIBUMI juga dibenci Phenomenon cir pro	[senser]	Mental
		AHOK dibenci, Phenomenon pro	[senser]	Mental
6	karena	NON MUSLIM, Attribute	[Ahok Carrier adalah] Pro	Relational
7	Tapi	JOKOWI yang MUSLIM juga dibenci. Phenomenon cir pro	[senser]	Mental
9		AHOK dibenci phenomenon pro	[senser]	Mental
10	karena	gaya bicaranya yang GALAK, carrier pro attribute		Relational
11	Tapi	JOKOWI yang santun dan penyabar juga dibenci. phenomenon cir pro	[senser]	Mental
13		Sebenarnya, Kenapa JOKOWI dan AHOK dibenci? Phenomenon pro	[senser]	Mental
14	Karena	Mereka terlalu jujur dan amanah. Carrier attribute	[Jokowi dan Ahok dibenci] [verb = process]	Relational
15		Pemimpin yang jujur dan amanah adalah musuh para Identified pro identifier koruptor.		Relational

In this simplified version discrepant linguistic structure like the previous meme is deployed. However, unlike the previous one, the relational process (8 clauses or 53%) on this meme dominates. This means that the act of defining Ahok's and Jokowi's state of being is ostensibly accentuated rather than propagating the ossification of positve image nor reinforcing/stigmatising the negative ones in the form of mental process. However, the accentuation of the state of being cannot hastily be considered as marganilising such notion, for the relational process is mostly positioned in the sub-clauses. This positioning plausibly dilutes the significance of the state of being of the image itself. In this sense, mental process seems to play pivotal role in the construction, although the senser as one of the central elements is ellipted seven times on the meme. The mental verbs ("*dibenci*") in the form of passive voice become the central point of this meme. This results not only in the detection the senser's absence, but that it also implicitly asks the spectators to decipher the identity of the senser.

The deciphering act can be conducted by focusing on the relational process used, mostly in the compound clauses. The relational clauses function

mostly as the circumstance of reason, i.e. providing justification for the argument posited. This meme linguistic structure resembles the previous one, i.e. positioning the phenomenon (Ahok and Jokowi) in contrast (if not in contradictory manner). At the same time, the constrasting act also occurs in the attibutes (*TIONGHOA vs PRIBUMI; NON MUSLIM vs MUSLIM; GALAK vs santun dan penyabar*). Scrutinising each clause is seen exigent as deliberate and accurate analysis will reveal the senser. The first sentence ("*Ahok dibenci karena dia Tionghoa,*") indicates that the one who hates Ahok is not Chinese descent – most likely the native Indonesian. However, the argument (native Indonesian is the hater) is otiose and futile when the compound clause "*tapi JOKOWI yang PRIBUMI juga dibenci*" resumes it. Using the same pattern for the clauses that follow, it is easily to jump into a (pre-)conclusion that the senser is the ones who hate Sino-Indonesian, native Indonesian, Muslim and non Muslim, grumpy, polite and patient figures.

However, the deployment of the word "*sebenarnya*" as the transition marker in the next section of the written text (this written text is arguably divided into two sections. From the top to the bottom reading pattern, the first section occupies three fourth of the written text whilst the second one the residue, i.e.the one fourth portion) demonstrates the same pattern of juxtaposing Jokowi and Ahok as one political entity in the form of circumstance of reason ("*karena mereka terlalu jujur dan amanah*") on the previous meme. The repeated pattern (of the first meme) then deploys to define the quality of their foes, i.e. the corruptors. In this sense, the initial argument is easily rectified as at this point it can be deduced that the ones who hate Ahok and Jokowi (the senser) are the ones (the corruptors) who detest honesty and trust; hate Sino-Indonesian; native

Indonesian; Muslim and non Muslim; grumpy, polite and patient figures. This proposition is convoluted as the ones who most likely dislike (if not detest) Ahok are the opponent camps. In this sense, compared with the previous meme, this simplified version demonstrates conspicious back campaign wrapped in the language of religious and cultural tolerance (as prevously discussed on the first meme) that ostensibly ossified the positive image of Ahok and stigmatised the negative image of the opposite camps.

Unlike the previous meme, the visual text lies on the top of the meme. The picture of Jokowi is positioned on the top left hand corner of the meme, whilst Ahok at the top right hand corner. This in the lens of Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) indicates that from the left-right reading pattern Jokowi is seen equal with Ahok. However, Jokowi's position on the top left hand corner (representing the familiar, commonsense knowledge) indicates that the spectator needs to focus on his image first and project the image to the next figure, i.e. Ahok whose picture is located on the opposite corner. In this sense, the projection will result in not only transferring the image quality of Jokowi, but that it also makes Ahok's figure can be perceived as an "issue[/] problem [/] solution" (Harrison, 2003, p. 57).

(Source: facebook)

No.	Conjunction	Clause	Ellipsis	Process
1.		AGAMA KAMI ISLAM, Carrier attribute	[adalah]	Relational
2.		KAMI MEMILIH AHOK BUKAN SEBAGAI PEMIMPIN Actor process goal AGAMA,		Material
3.	TAPI	HANYA PELAKSANA RODA PEMERINTAHAN DKI JAKARTA Cir goal	[kami actor memilih pro Ahok] goal	Relational

Unlike the two previous memes, this meme deploys relational process as the dominant one, whilst material process is deployed to indicate the action of choosing Ahok as the desired candidate. A close examination visually unfolds that the identity of the supporters/ volunteers (two women wearing Jasmev t-shirt with hijab). The donning of Jasmev t-shirt combined with hijab connotes the amalgam of the so called nationalist attribute with the Islamic one. Reading the visual text from the left to the right denotes that the woman standing on the left side is giving her thumb-up smiling to the camera together with the smiling woman on her right side who is wearing spectacles. They are the addressers of this meme. The arrow below them which indicates the written baloon inscribed *"Agama kami Islam, (sic.) kami memilih Ahok bukan sebagai pemimpin agama, tapi hanya sebagai pelaksana roda pemerintahan"*. Seeing this meme, the eyes of the spectator will concentrate on the written expressions of these two women, which appears as a confession. The addressers here seem to function as the reinforcing element of the message on the written text.

The linguistic analysis of the written text unfolds that not only the relational process dominates (66.7%), but that it also demonstrates that elements that constitute the process (in this case carrier and attribute) are deployed to signify their religious identity of the supporter/volunteers (Muslim) and connote their Muslimness. The material process (*"memilih"*) is used as the process that precedes the relational clauses (*"Ahok bukan sebagai pemimpin agama"* and *"[Ahok] hanya [sebagai] pelaksana roda pemerintahan"*). Juxtaposing *"pemimpin agama"* with *"pelaksana roda pemerintahan"* will result in paralleling the negated notions of the religious leader with the notion of the leader for the [local] government. The deployment of the noun (*'leader'*) signifies the affinity though written in different forms of structure (negative versus positive). In this sense, they attempt to amplify (if not glorify) the secular notion that religion and government are two different entities. Thus, for them choosing non Muslim figure as a leader is permissible, let alone in their lens the incumbent has unsurpassed performance compared to his predecessors .

Conclusion

Ahok's supporters/volunteers position the issues of religiosity and

leadership in interrelated manner. They see these as an inseparable issue as the act of framing Ahok's image as the DKI Jakarta provincial leader is closely connected with the actions he took, in this case, especially, related to the religious and cultural issues. The three memes use mental and relational processes as the method employed by the supporters/volunteers to instil and ossify the image they wish to propagate. They deployed the mental process to influnce the mental state of the spectators whilst the relational is employed to promote Ahok in the form of political, religous and cultural descriptive language. They use the weasel claim advertising language, i.e. the language of advertising that is analogous to the way the weasel consumes an egg. The weasel sucks out the inside substance of an egg, but keeps the shell intact. This means that the language of the meme the supporters/volunteers produce lacks of the evidences as it is merely aimed at countering the circulating detested opinions that are most likely developed by the opposite camps.

The presence of the patron figure in the visual and written texts reinforces the patronage-based system inside this group. This is instrumental as the meme aims not to contrast the patron's image with the candidate, but to amplify it. However, this does not mean that the act of contrasting is not conducted. This is deployed on the superficial level to plausibly contradict, especially the issue of religious tolerance, in the form of contrasting (if not contradict) and at the same time converging the ostensible binary opoosition between Muslim/non Muslim, Chinese/native Indonesian, grumpy/polite and patient, into the qualities Jokowi and Ahok share, i.e. honest, trustworthy, hard-working, dedicated, and incorruptible. The third meme reinforces the aforementioned Aspinall's proposition of the Indonesian electorates' characteristic, i.e. that they value performace more than piety in the framework of Muslim's Indonesia secular democracy.

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