

Puritanism Vis-A-Vis Traditionalism: Islam in Modern Indonesia

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Abstrak

Gerakan Islamisme di Indonesia, yang menguat setelah terjadinya reformasi politik di akhir tahun 1990an, telah berkembang meluas ke berbagai segmen masyarakat, sehingga melahirkan masyarakat santri baru yang secara kuat mempraktekkan Islam. Di luar kenyataan bahwa ia memberi dampak positif terhadap keberagaman masyarakat, gerakan ini telah menampilkan wajah yang berbeda dengan Islam pada masa sebelumnya. Pengaruh kuat dari hadirnya organisasi-organisasi Islam internasional di Indonesia, yang menyertai Islamisme ini, telah melahirkan masyarakat Islam baru yang puritan dan bahkan intoleran terhadap perbedaan-perbedaan yang ada dalam masyarakat. Karenanya, penguatan Wahhabisme yang dibawa oleh kalangan Salafi dalam gerakan ini telah menyebabkan munculnya konflik di kalangan masyarakat Islam Indonesia, karena gerakan untuk menciptakan "the pristine Islam" (Islam yang asli) ini, telah mengundang reaksi kalangan "tradisional" yang akomodatif dan sebagai segmen terbesar masyarakat Indonesia. Karena itulah, di samping telah melahirkan kelompok-kelompok Islam baru yang membawa misi "Islam yang bersih", gerakan baru Islamisme ini, pada sisi lain, telah mengundang dan menyebabkan menguatnya kembali gerakan tradisionalisme. Dengan kata lain, lahirnya gerakan Islamisme modern di Indonesia telah menyebabkan lahirnya Islam dengan karakter fundamentalis puritan yang berhadapan dengan para pendukung tradisionalisme sebagai mainstream Islam Indonesia.

Abstract

Islamic movement in Indonesia that become stronger during political reformation in the end of 1990s, has been spread to every segment of society. It has created new religious school students who practice religious dogma. Out of the reality, it gives positive effect toward society's faith. This movement has made new Islam face which differs from the old ones. The strong effect of various international organisations in this country which bring Islamism, has created new puritan and intolerant to various differences in the society. The Wahhabism that is carried by various salafi in this movement trigger various conflicts among Indonesian moslems. It is because this movement has made the pristine Islam and make many reactions the tradisionalists who accommodative and as majority Indonesia moslems. The new movements has in fact, invited and strengthened traditionalism. In other words, the born of modern Islamism movement has caused developing Islam with puritan fundamental characteristic face to face with traditionalism as Indonesian Islam mainstream.

Democratic reforms in Indonesia, following the fall of the New Order Government, has provided an opportunity for the emergence of new Islamic organizations, namely Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahideen Council), Hizbuttahrir Indonesia (Liberation Party)¹, Salafi, and Lasjkar Jihad (Militia of Jihad). They have an agenda to develop Islam in general, and the first two of these organizations even have a special agenda, particularly with regard to formal application of the *shari'a* (lit. Islamic law) and the establishment of an Islamic State. Due to their strong attention towards Islam, some social scientists call them fundamentalist, i.e. Islamic group which is different from other Muslim communities whose views are moderate and their practice of Islam are not strictly puritanical.

Although not significant enough, the number of members of these organizations is increasing from year to year. Hizbuttahrir Indonesia (HTI), for example, claims to have more than 100 thousand people as its members in 2001, which was later increased to 1.2 million by 2011 (The Jakarta Post, 18, 2011). This success seems to relate to their being representatives of international organizations. At least, they have the same ideas and views as that of international organizations, having the same name, so that they are like a branch breeding ideas of Islam and are used to build Islamic politics pursued internationally. This development shows that these organizations, as alleged by social scientists, have attracted many Muslims in Indonesia coming from different backgrounds.

¹Since its formation, Hizbuttahrir Indonesia (HTI) is more ideological and political oriented. It tries to pursue the application of the *shari'a* and the formation of *khilafa Islamiyya* (Islamic Caliphate). It is suggested that HTI is playing the role of political party and indeed it is a political party even though it never took part in the formal Indonesian politics, so that it never takes part in any election as well.

This article will discuss the issues related to the emergence of these Islamic organizations which happen to all of them leaning on Wahhabism². In the article I refer to them as Puritans since Islamic puritanism has become their attention even though in some ways they are different from each other. In addition, the term puritan covers highly diverse inclinations, from manifest legalism to the establishment of the Islamic polity and propagation for pristine Islam. Because they have a difference in terms of Islamic practice from other Islamic organizations, their efforts to spread their ideas and implement what they believe, related to the *shari'a*, has led to the emergence of a negative response from Muslim society, a larger number of whom is adhering to Sunnism³. Their excoriation on the Sunni religious practices has caused their *da'wa* (preaching) raises conflicts between Muslim in Indonesia.

Organisational Plurality

The establishment of Islamic organizations by Muslims in Indonesia is related to their efforts to strengthen their practice of Islam, disseminating its ideology or conserving its culture. The formation of Muhammadiyah⁴ in 1912 is meant to do Islamic modernization and purification, i.e. intended to change some Islamic practices so far conducted by Muslims in Indonesia generally. In the Muhammadiyah perspective, these

²Wahhabism is a sect among the Sunni embraced by most Muslims in Saudi Arabia. The term Wahhabism is referred to its founder, Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab. It is developed with the support from the authority of Saudi Arabia, and is ensured and consolidated by its being adopted as the ideology of the kingdom.

³Although some people regard them as the Sunni, the Wahhabi are different in some respects from the Sunni in regard to their practice of Islam, so that Wahhabism is categorised as a sect within the Sunni.

⁴Muhammadiyah is the first Islamic organisation influenced by the development of Wahhabism. The spirit of puritanism is believed as an important factor which gave rise to the formation of Muhammadiyah as it is evidenced by the effort of its exponents to cleanse Islam from all novel practices not found during the Prophet Muhammad life.

practices were not in line with what was ordered by the Qur'an and the hadith, the two sources of Islam. The mission of Muhammadiyah was hence to return Islam to conform to what was written in these two sources. The founder of this organisation wanted to uphold what is called the pristine Islam, so that purification became an issue it was struggling for.

The same holds true with what was carried out by another Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)⁵, established 14 years later after the formation of Muhammadiyah. The founders of NU were determined to practice and develop an "ideology" which they called *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama'a*⁶. The formation of this organization is speculatively regarded as a reaction against efforts made by the Muhammadiyah which in many respects tries to put aside some practices of Islam of the former. This means that the propagation made by the Muhammadiyah has been regarded as a threat, which would delegitimize the existing religious practice of Indonesian Muslims by that time. Because NU formation was to defend the existing practice of Islam, it was unavoidable that conflict had arisen between members of these organisations because they were arguing sharply about the right Islam.

As a reaction, NU's mission is hence to uphold the practice of Islam based on *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama'a* which in many respects has a similar mission to that conveyed by the earlier preacher of Islam in Indonesia, namely "Walisongo" (lit. nine

saints⁷). So, while NU's members adhere to Sunni Islam, the Muhammadiyah's are mostly inclined to Wahhabism⁸, which since its formation in Indonesia has been provoking Islamic purification, by asking Muslims to return to the Qur'an and the hadith, as the only two sources of Islam. So, while NU promotes to follow one of the four *madhhab* (school of law in Islam), the Muhammadiyah propagates to avoid following any *madhhab*.

The purification by Muhammadiyah was similar to that propagated by the Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia. As widely known, the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab who was influenced by the thought of Ibn Taimiyyah, assumed that *shari'a* and *sunna*⁹ are the only acceptable model for Muslim conduct. He accordingly rejected or was hostile towards local culture which influenced Muslim practice of Islam (Woodward et.al, 2011). This is so since the adoption of local culture which was regarded as pre-Islamic has created impurity in regard to Muslim practice of Islam. In addition, there is also a religious practice such as a visit to the tomb and praying for the dead, which in some ways are colored by the existence of deviations, so that it prompted the mentality that is not positive, such as begging on the dead. The revitalization or purification of Islam was hence assumed as a panacea, so that Muslims would no longer away from the right path.

⁷Walisongo was a very well known Islamic preachers in Indonesia who succeeded in Islamizing Java. They did the *da'wa* in a very accommodative manner. For example, they use *wayang* (puppet) performance to call people to embrace Islam. This way of *da'wa* had enriched the face of Indonesian Islam which is moderate, tolerant and in some ways colored by local culture. However, this would be inappropriate, seen from the perspective of the adherents of Wahhabism.

⁸Many Muhammadiyah members do not accept this "accusation" especially in these days where Wahhabism is notoriously condemned by some Muslims. But they nonetheless acknowledge that Muhammadiyah is more or less inspired by two Middle East Muslim intellectuals, namely Rashid Ridlo and Muhammad Abduh whose thinkings were affected Wahhabism.

⁹Sunna here is meant a "trodden path", a customar practice to indicate specific sayings and actions of the Prophet.

⁵NU is the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia in term of its member. It was established in 1926, and was said to have more than forty million members.

⁶A saying of the Prophet Muhammad suggests that his *umma* (society) will be divided into 73 groups. All would go to hell except one, that is the *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama'a*. This saying, however, is interpreted differently. The existing groups or sects are claiming to be *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama'a*. Among the well known groups are Sunni (claiming as the practicer of *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama'a*), *shi'it* and *kharijite*. Some scholars included in the groups the *wahhabi*.

The two organisations, Muhammadiyah and NU focus their program on *da'wa* (preaching) and education. They empower their preachers and facilitate them, so that the messages conveyed by these organisations reach Muslims at the grassroots level. In the field of education, Muhammadiyah develops *sekolah* (school), providing the student with a variety of materials on Islam and secular subjects. NU, on the other hand, has been empowering the *pesantren*¹⁰, i.e. traditional Islamic educational institution, providing study on Islam. So, the purpose of these organisations is to develop Islam in general, including to empower the economy of the *umma* (Islam society).

Different from these two organisations, the formation of some new Islamic organisations, especially after political reforms took place in 1998, sounded more political than based on the ideas propagated by the two organisations above. These new Islamic organisations were established in accordance with developing Islamic politics which during the reign of Suharto did not have a favourable place, since he was allergic with what was called Islamic politics. Accordingly these new Islamic organisations focus their attention on the application of Islamic *shari'a* in Indonesia. The application here is not confined to implementing Islamic teachings but also to conduct formalisation of the *shari'a* politically, i.e. making it the source of Indonesian law. Some scientists call these groups as fundamentalist since they interpret the need for Islam to be in political power as a core value of Islam.

The discourse developed by these organisations is hence concerned with

¹⁰The *pesantren* is the oldest system of education in Indonesia. Before the modern education system was introduced by the Dutch, the *pesantren* was the only available educational institution. Socially, the *pesantren* has played an important role in the spread of Islam in Indonesia. It has become a means of formal socialisation through which Islamic belief, norms and values are transmitted and inculcated through teaching. It also constitutes a medium for developing Islamic precepts and maintaining its orthodoxy.

creating Islamic state or even *khilafa Islamiyya* (Islamic caliphate). The idea about the former is closely related to the application of the *shari'a*. Because the *shari'a* could only be enforced by the State, the idea of the formation of the Islamic State became very important, so it becomes their main agenda. Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all of these Islamic organisations emphasize the importance of the establishment of Islamic state at the same degree, not to mention the *khilafa Islamiyya*. It is only the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and the Hizbullah Indonesia (HTI) which propagate a lot of the establishment of *khilafa Islamiyya*. The MMI stressed about the importance of establishing the *khilafa* at its first congress in Yogyakarta in the year 2002. In the year 2007, the need to establish the *khilafa* was largely supported by Indonesian Muslims, gathering at the congress on *khilafa Islamiyya* organised by the Hizbullah Indonesia.

This fact indicates that Islam in Indonesia is not homogeneous in terms of its practices carried out by its adherents. Muslims are grouped into what is called adherents of Sunnism and that of Wahhabism. The Indonesian Sunnis represented by the NU's community while the adherents of Wahhabism is represented by Muhammadiyah members. Although some of current Muhammadiyah members refuse to be deemed as the Wahhabis, it is a general knowledge that this organisation was informed by Wahhabism, since its establishment was inspired by the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 20th century. The Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis, lit. Muslim Union) are the two oldest Islamic organizations in Indonesia embracing Wahhabism, although the former is getting less strict in terms of its cynicism towards the non-Wahhabi adherents.

The Sunni Muslims are those who usually acknowledge themselves as following one of the four *madhhab*, while the Wahabbis base their practice of Islam on what was taught by Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab¹¹. The former often relate their practice of Islam to the *madhhab* of Shafi'i, Hanbali, Maliki or Hanafi, while the latter relate to no one but Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab. In addition, the Sunnis always refer to the Qur'an, the hadith, the *ijma'* (consensus of the *'ulama*) and *qiyas* (analogy) as their sources for practising Islam, while the Wahabbis only refer to the Qur'an and the hadith. Accordingly, the NU tradition of referring to one of the four *madhhab* and its use of the *ijma'* has made its members constantly refer to the work of *salaf* (earlier) *'ulama* for any interpretation which they make, while Muhammadiyah members try to use only the Qur'an and the hadith to come to the correct interpretation of any problem, without having to refer to the work of *salaf* (earlier) or *kholaf* (later) *'ulama*.

From their characteristics, the other new Islamic organizations mentioned above, i.e. Hizbuttahrir, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, and Salafi can be subsumed under the adherents of Wahhabism since they have similarity with Muhammadiyah in terms of their practice of Islam and their efforts to purify it. Even it can be said that the exponents of especially Salafi organisation in Indonesia constitute a younger generation derived from Persis and Muhammadiyah. This generation is really inspired by Wahhabi movement grown in Saudi Arabia and by the current political problem encountered by Muslims in this region. Exponents of this generation were sent by Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII, lit. Indonesia Council for Islamic Da'wa),

studying Islam in the Middle East, so that they brought about the idea of Islamism or fundamentalism in many respects when they returned to Indonesia in the 1980s. They can be called as the second generation of Wahhabi adherents seen from their effort to practice Islam in a more puritanical manner. They organized a group of Islamic propagation in modern and secular campuses, especially big campuses such as University of Indonesia, Gajahmada University, and Bogor Institute of Agriculture. They succeeded in creating fanatic cadres to uphold a leaned Wahhabi ideology. Nevertheless, as happen to Wahhabi adherents anywhere, they prefer to be referred to as the Salafi than the Wahhabi.

Although there is no principle difference in terms of Islamic practices between Sunni Muslims and the adherents of Wahhabism, there are general characteristics which differentiate them from each other. The sociological bases underlying the existence of these two blocks of Islamic groups are different. The Wahhabi group is generally more preoccupied with idealised efforts and is trying to change the social reality of Muslim society in regard to its religious practice, which in their perspective, is neither ideal nor religiously correct. In their perspectives, there must be a socio-political movement to alter it. On the other hand, the group following Sunnism¹² has been trying to nurture and develop the existing religious beliefs, practices and cultures in general. This attitude is based on a formula of *ushul fiqh* (lit. sources of jurisprudence): *al-muhafaza bi'l-qadim al-salih wa'l-akhdhu bi'l-jadid al-aslah* (lit. preserving the good existing order and adopting the new one which is better). The former is trying to develop towards

¹¹As known, 'Abd al-Wahhab was the founder of Wahhabism. He gained support from Muhammad bin Su'ud, the chieftain of the village of Dir'iyya and then the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 'Abd al-Wahhab introduced a very strict puritanical teaching which has been ensured and consolidated by its being adopted as the ideology of the kingdom.

¹²Some scientists suggest that the emergence of NU in 1926 was a reaction to what was being done by Muhammadiyah conducting purification. This suggestion derives from the fact that NU was trying to nurture the existing Islamic belief and practices and was established after the Muhammadiyah had been in existence for about 15 years.

an idealised situation in a very strict and puritanical manner, while the latter is working within the real social situation.

The Domain of Difference

The difference between the practices of Islam of various organisations in Indonesia actually happens only in the domain of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). This means that this difference does not impinge on the substantial ideology of Islam, but rather it touches only on parts commonly called *furu'* (lit. branches). The doctrinal dimension which differentiates them derives from their difference in interpreting the precepts of the Qur'an. For example, there is a different interpretation on the concept of *lamsu an-nisa* (Arabic, lit. touching¹³ woman) which according to the Sunni can delegitimize one's *wudu* (ablution)¹⁴. Sunni Muslims interpreted the concept of *lamsu* as a touching, while the Puritans adhering to Wahhabism understand it as coitus. Accordingly, for the latter, if one has a *wudu* and then he touches a woman, he needs not to take another *wudu* to make him religiously clean. Conversely, for the Sunni he should take another *wudu*. This difference in understanding the concept, however, does not create much problem in the Muslim society.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that although this difference occurs only in the domain of *furu'* which touches only on aspects of *fiqh* matters, it is expressed through their praxis of Islamic rituals in everyday life and influence their world view and social behaviour. So, this different interpretation of the available doctrine has given rise to an unfavourable

¹³The concept is *Laa mastum an-nisa*. *Laa mastum* from *lamasa* which is commonly used by the Arab to mean to touch. But the Muhammadiyah, a big organization informed by Wahhabism, interpret it as coitus.

¹⁴*Wudu* is a prerequisite for a Muslim when he or she is going to take a prayer. It is a minor ritual washing of face, hands and legs, touching head and ears with water. However, it is not only a procession to clean a Muslim body but also a symbol of cleanness from religious perspective.

situation of conflict between the Puritans and the Sunnis since the former has been trying to conduct purification on the common practices of Islam such as those practised by NU society. Moreover, the criticism on such religious practices by the Puritans is felt disparaging since in this case they think of it as sinful.

The most problematic praxis incurring conflict are those commonly deemed as heretical, such as *tahlil* and *mauleed nabi*. *Tahli* is a ritual conducted within 7 days, following one's death, while *mauleed nabi* is the commemoration of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. The essence of *tahlil* is to stress the oneness of Allah in that it is reciting *la ilaha illa Allah* (There is no God but Allah). The purpose of performing such ritual is to pray for the dead, hoping that Allah may accept his *'ibada* (observance required by the Islamic faith), and forgive his sins. Other practices, which incur conflict due to sharp criticism by the Puritans, are *dhikr* (lit. recollection of God) after prayer and reciting *sura Yasin* on Thursday night. The same holds true with such a ritual as *ziyara* (visiting the grave), which in the opinion of the Puritans can be amounting to *shirk* (to believe in God other than Allah).

From the fact that there is a different understanding relating to the basis of cultural and religious practice of Indonesian Muslims, one should go over on the important concept in Islam. This concept is related to the perception of religious practices which were not performed by the Prophet Muhammad and the earlier generation of his *sahaba* (companions). These practices are conceptualised in what is commonly called *bid'a* (heretical practice). The interpretation of the concept of *bid'a* at the grassroots level, however, occurs in a rather haphazard manner. The Puritans conceptualise what they call *bid'a* in terms of black and white. Everything not

practised by the Prophet Muhammad is deemed to be *bid'a* by lay Puritans. This understanding derives from the Islamic doctrine according to which "each *bid'a* is going astray, and those going astray would go to hell" ("qullu *bid'a* zolala, wa qullu zolala fi al-nar").

While the Puritans strictly suggest that all *bid'a* is 'zolala' (going astray), the Sunni, on the other hand, do not always consider the *bid'a* to be bad. They classify *bid'a* into two kinds, that is *bid'a hasana* and *bid'a sayyi'a* (bad and good *bid'a*). In their opinion, it is only the bad *bid'a* can bring its doer to hell. Thus such '*ibada* as *tahlil* is of significance, since it is not only classified as good Islamic practice but can also accrue to what is religiously expected of all Muslims. Such practice could therefore be subsumed under what is commonly called *sunna* (recommended)¹⁵. By performing such thing, a Muslim hopes to add the other '*ibada* to his religious obligations, which he might have carried out imperfectly.

The underlying difference in understanding the concept of *bid'a*, which marks the Sunni's and the Puritan's practice of Islam, is limited to what is called '*ibada* (Islamic ritual). However, this has occurred not only at the level of interpretation of Islamic precepts but also at the level of worldview. Based on their understanding of the concept of *bid'a* and their adaptation to the existing order, the Sunni Muslims in Indonesia have always grounded their understandings of Islamic practice in terms of its benefit for Islam and Muslim society as a whole. So, the adoption of a culture inherited from Hinduism, for example, is due to its being regarded as advantageous for Muslims after it is coloured by Islamic values. This

acculturation is of important significance since it would enrich Islamic culture in general. On the other hand, the Puritans are inclined to attribute such social reality to what they call "divinely ordered", and purification means to put aside all the unnecessary practices in order to conform to what is "religiously ordered".

So, the Puritans consider their Islamic practice as purer and better because they discard anything "less Islamic". They consider that much of Sunni's practice of Islam is mixed with that of other religions, so that the Sunni, like NU society, have been called syncretic. On the other hand, the Sunni regard the Puritans' practice of Islam as too rigid because of their tendency to be in avoidance, in many respects, of the existing socio-cultural environment. The Puritans base their standpoint on strictness as it is conceptualised by the Qur'an, so that they only do what is religiously ordered (written in the Qur'an and the hadith). For the Sunnis, working on what is not definitely prohibited by the Qur'an and the hadith in their practice of Islam is allowed, since it can not only enrich the culture of Islam itself due to its adoption of the existing local culture, but it is also backed by strong arguments. In the opinion of a Sunni Muslim, Islam not only comprises pure ritual practices as described by the Qur'an or the hadith, but also pays attention to understanding the psychological aspect of its adherents' lives. By this he means that any effort to understand the social life of an Islamic society should not neglect the psychological aspect of the society. He suggested further that "the application of a certain interpretation in regard to such '*ibada* (devotional action) as *tahlil*, should take into consideration the psychological dimension of the local people's lives". The ritual practices conducted by the Sunni, in his opinion, have been more '*ibada* in character rather than deviating from the 'real' Islam itself. "Tahlil, for example,

¹⁵ There are five qualifications of behaviour which the Islamic law and ethics have traditionally categorised (Netton, 1992:22). These are *wajib* (obligatory), *sunna* (recommended), *mubah* (morally neutral), *makruh* (reprehensible) and *haram* (forbidden). The obligatory '*ibada*, like prayer five times a day, is clearly written. The recommended '*ibada*, like *tahlil*, is a matter of interpretation.

which is regarded by the Puritans as heretical, is actually very Islamic since all the *tahlil* rituals are *dhikr* (stating the oneness of Allah)", he emphasised.

Despite criticism or even humiliation made by the Puritans against the Sunnis in Indonesia, it can be argued that in general the issue debated by both sides has actually been trivial, with no religious significance. The issue mentioned as *bid'a* by member of Muhammadiyah in regards with what was practiced by that of NU, which gave rise to tension between both sides in villages in Java, for example, revolved around insignificant matters. In addition to *tahlil* and other practices mentioned above, which are not essential parts of the religious rituals, another significant issue needs to mention – due to its being debated frequently particularly in the 1950s– is using a *bedug*¹⁶ in a mosque. The *bedug* for the lay Puritan, for example, is indeed *bid'a*, in the sense of being novel because it was not found during the Prophet's life. For the Sunni, however, the use of *bedug* is not a primary part of the religious ritual. It is merely used to give a signal to Muslims that the time for prayer has come. It is therefore evident that much of the conflict derived not from different understanding of the essence of Islam or of its theology, but rather it originates from their tendency to underestimate and humiliate each other or even just to being different.

From what is discussed above, it is evident that the essence of the logic sustaining their arguments about *bid'a*, for example, is actually blurred, as is shown by some facts. Although the Puritans never use *bedug*, in that it is deemed as *bid'a*, it is an irony instead that they use loud speaker, an indication

that in many respects their argument is based on unfounded generalisations. So their concept of *bid'a* can be misleading. It is evident that there is inconsistency in their arguments concerning the concept of *bid'a*. Not only do their interpretations vary but, in some cases, they were paradoxical. The idea that a *bedug* is *bid'a* is interesting when compared it with other modern innovations, such as loud speakers, which are used as tools almost in all Islamic rituals. Almost no one single mosque built in a city in Indonesia which does not use loud speaker to call people for prayer. So, their generalisation about what is and what is not *bid'a* does not derive but from inconsistent principles.

The Problem Incurred

The problem of difference in understanding Islam that incurred conflict has actually decreased in the 1990s. It is meant that there was no significant conflict between Muslims of different organisations. This is so as the pattern of *da'wa* (preaching) carried out by Islamic preacher has changed. Although some *da'wa* are planned by Islamic organisations, such as Muhammadiyah, but such *da'wa* do not touch on the existing *khilafiyah* matters (lit.controversial) in general and do not impinge on the Sunni's practice of Islam. The *da'wa* is merely a medium to deliver Islamic messages as it should. In villages in Java, for example, some *pengajian* (religious gathering) were established on a family basis. These *pengajian* move from house to house every fortnight. They were a breakthrough which not only indicated the increased interest of Muslims in giving *da'wa*, but also a change in the relationship between various Islamic groups. This pattern of *da'wa* has not only prevented open conflict, derived from group exclusivism, but has also introduced new values that are properly better from an Islamic perspective.

¹⁶The *bedug* is a wooden drum which is beaten to give an indication to society that prayer time has come. It is a common tool available in any mosque of the Sunni Muslims. The *bedug* is deemed as *bid'a* by the Indonesian Wahhabi since it is novel in the sense of not being available during the Prophet's life.

Factors contributing to the success of such *da'wa* is the persuasive nature conducted by Islamic preachers. There is no significant conflict with or refusal of such *da'wa* since the adaptive nature of Muslim society, especially the Sunnis, has made the *da'wa* of any preacher acceptable. It is commonly understood that *da'wa* should be conducted in a very smooth way as that ordered by Islam. It should not confront or criticise other groups of Muslim. The preachers should understand properly about the existence of pluralistic Islamic groupings in Indonesia. Such groupings should be accepted in the context of the existing different understanding of Islam itself held by various segments of the Islamic community.

So, the Muhammadiyah in some districts in East Java, for example, has changed its pattern of *da'wa* among Muslims, whereas it has traditionally tried to cut off or cleanse Islam from traditions adopted by the Sunni. With its efforts to be more accommodating to the existing culture, it has tried to be less radical in its *da'wa* among the Sunnis, so that in some areas in East and Central Java it gradually gained new members from other Islamic organisations (see Suyatni, 2010). A young Muhammadiyah¹⁷ activist ever suggested that the change in strategy to be more accommodating to the existing socio-cultural situation is a necessity if Muhammadiyah wants to be accepted by Muslims in Java. He conducted a door-to-door *da'wa* encouraging the people around his neighbourhood to attend *pengajian* and practice Islam in their daily lives without promoting his Muhammadiyah message. He avoided the criticisms on people's practice of Islam

which do not accord his understanding, so that the discordant situation resulted from different Islamic understandings has declined, despite the fact that each Islamic group retains a cynical attitude deriving from such differences which are expressed in everyday life.

This favourable situation, however, changed significantly when political reforms was conducted after former President Suharto stepped down. The introduction of democracy resulted from the reforms has given rise to the emergence of new Islamic groups, most of which are leaned to Wahhabism. The Salafi is the most rigid and fanatical in promoting its idea and practice of Islam, so that the conflicts which flourished among Muslim groups in Indonesia during the 1950s has recurred. The Puritans, who feel that they have done the correct thing in terms of their practice of Islam, regard the religious practices of the Sunnis as deviating from the correct Islam. Because the former are also successful in recruiting new members, they become more aggressive in propagating their practice of Islam. They provoke to practice a pristine Islam and to put aside all the practices classified as *bid'a*, a situation incurring conflict.

The Salafi has accordingly become a well known name to most Muslims at grassroots level, since the Wahhabis always call themselves as the Salafi. So, anything they do in regards with their *da'wa* in general and their criticism towards religious practice of the Sunni in particular are commonly valued with reference to the practice of the *Salaf el-Shalih*, i.e. the three generations of *sahaba* (companion of the Prophet Muhammad), *Tabi'in* (following the *sahaba*), and *Tabi'u at-Tabi'in* (following the *tabi'in*). They call themselves the Salafi just to indicate that they are following the *Salaf el-Shalih* in their practice of Islam. This acknowledgment is of important significance since the

¹⁷Of the two known organisations well informed by Wahhabism, i.e. the Muhammadiyah and Persis, it is only the Muhammadiyah which has a wider *da'wa* program. The *da'wa* of Persis is confined to that conducted in West Java, particularly Bandung, due to its being small organisation, so that its conflict with other Sunni Islamic organisation is very local. In Central Java, Persis is almost not known.

practice of Islam of *Salaf el-Shalih* is guaranteed as right. They prefer being called Salafi to Wahhabi, because the latter means to follow Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab, which in their perspective is not acceptable in Islam.

Of the three leaned Wahhabi organizations, the Salafi is indeed the most aggressive in regard with propagating their Islam. The two others, i.e. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Hizbuttahrir Indonesia, have been preoccupied with political struggle. The Salafi proponents have hence organized movements which sound very threatening, such as *Movement of Anti-Mauleed* or of *Anti-Bid'a*. This is meant to show people that they prohibit to commemorate the birthday of the Prophet and do not allow to conduct any *bid'a*, both of which are classified as *haram* (religiously forbidden). They also established radio stations providing *da'wa* program, most of which is to criticize and even to disparage other Muslims because of the latter's practice of what they call *bid'a*. The Salafi contend that the practice of other Muslims as wrong, and regard those who continue practicing it as *kafir* (infidel), so that such practice can bring its doer to hell. This situation is worsened by the fact that the Salafi proponents have different political orientations from that of the Sunni, so that their unwillingness to assimilate or cooperate has been sustained. Relations between the groups have also deteriorated because of their views which encourage them to be continuously different¹⁸.

Some Muslim leaders have big concern about this situation. The success of Salafi in developing its *da'wa* which in fact reach student at high schools and its rigid understanding about Islam in addition to

¹⁸There is a famous opinion of ulama suggesting that: "difference (in standpoint) between my *umma* could be a blessing". This suggestion may establish a positive situation where Islam actually allows its people to have different standpoints in understanding a particular problem or a different ideological orientation as a means to pursue Islamic goals. Islam could actually instill a freedom of thinking among its *umma*.

its determination to conduct purification has been raising a response from other Muslims, i.e. the Sunni, who feel that their own interpretation and practice of Islam is correct because it is based on the thought of an imam of a *madhhab*. In addition, the Salafi effort to extend its own particular practice to groups which perform different practices of Islam has given rise to manifest conflicts as commonly expressed in the struggle to manage a mosque. As a mosque is not only a symbol of Muslim existence in society but also a representation of a particular practice of Islam, a group which owns or manages a mosque could expand its influence in society. So, a mosque is a very important medium through which religious beliefs and practices are disseminated since Muslims gathered there five times daily to perform their practice of Islam. Since most of the mosques in Javanese villages are erected by member of the Sunni Muslims, they have become a target of Salafi *da'wa*, so that they become a place where the conflict between the Sunni and Salafi adherents is manifest.

The Revival of Traditionalism

Despite criticism and even humiliation against religious practices which are regarded as *bid'a* by the Puritan Muslims, the Sunnis in Indonesia have a new spirit in nurturing and developing their practices of Islam. As anyone can see, in many cities in Indonesia have emerged some groups with Sunni spirit promoting to do *dhikr*, conducting *mauleed* and reciting *sholawat* (praying for the Prophet)¹⁹. These religious gatherings are usually carried out in a mosque or in other places, and are attended by thousands of Muslims. It is interesting to note that the gatherings are not only performed

¹⁹The Essence of *Sholawat* is to pray for the Prophet Muhammad. Some *Ulama* created various *sholawat*, many of them are in the form of poem. The *sholawat* is recited during religious rituals and sung in any religious gathering.

by Muslims living in such a big city as Jakarta but also by those living in a city of *kabupaten* (regency) or even of *Kecamatan* (district).

In Jakarta, the practices of *dhikr* known nationally are those led by Arifin Ilham. Although he does not practice sufism, the *dhikr* he conducted is similar to that of sufism, i.e. to praise God and ask His mercy and forgiveness. NU, as the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, also conducted big *dhikr* gatherings in 2007 and 2009 attended by two hundred thousand Muslims coming from all Jakarta regions with the aim to ask Allah's mercy for the safety of the nation and Indonesia. Besides those practicing *dhikr*, there are groups of Muslim focusing on reciting *sholawat*. In Jakarta, there are well known groups, such as "Majlis Nurul Mustofa", "Majlis Rasulullah", "Majlis Assamaawat" and "Majlis Dzikir Al-Salafi"²⁰.

Similar group called "Ahbabul Mustofa", meaning the lover of Prophet Muhammad, was established in Jogjakarta. The leader of this group is often invited to conduct *dhikr*, *do'a* (praying) and *sholawat* in Jakarta by the above groups, a situation indicating that these *sholawat* groups are in coordination. The spirit motivating them is religious, i.e. to encourage Muslims to love their prophet (Muhammad) and to accost Allah to get His *rahma* (blessing) and forgiveness. What is interesting in regard with the groups is the fact that they succeed in breeding branches in many cities in Jawa. So, one would find groups with the name of "Ahbabul Mustofa" in other cities in Central Java. They organised programs of *dhikr* and *sholawat* most of which were attended by thousands of Muslims. In addition it is not rare that the sessions are attended by the government authority, members of local parliament and other public figures.

²⁰Assalafi here does not have any relation with Salafi as a movement inclined to Wahhabism. Many religious practices of the Assalafi, like reciting *sholawat*, are denied by the Salafi who regard them as *bid'a*.

The actual practice of *dhikr* or *Sholawatis* not new. What is interesting is that this religious activity has gained wider acclaim from the public in the last two decades. Analysts and researchers linked this phenomenon with the rise of Islam in general that have occurred in Islamic countries. Among them are some who call it a symptom of urban Sufism, because it is growing in urban areas. Although less precise to call it Sufism, performing *dhikr* in order to approach Allah is close to Sufism. At least there are similarities with Sufism or even *tariqa* (sufi orders) in terms of building inner aspects of Muslim life and of accosting Allah to be His beloved. The different between these groups and that of *tariqa* which is really practicing sufism is clear, although it should be acknowledged that they basically do the *dhikr* with the aim to be closed to Allah, asking his forgiveness and begging His *rahma* (blessing).

Thus, the session of *dhikr* and reciting *sholawat* is basically to perform *do'a*. What Muslims ask through their *do'a* is to have a good live in this world, such as financially better including in worshipping God, and to get a better live in the hereafter, i.e. God's acceptance to all of their *'ibada* and their possibility to enter to God's paradise. These are the essence of what commonly Muslims ask, as it is contained in their *do'a*: "Oh God, give us a good live in this world and in the hereafter, and protect us from torture in the hell". In addition to the *do'a*, they also sang some Arabic song which basically contains *do'a*. Few among other songs are: I ask Allah's forgiveness, the God of the creature
I ask Allah's forgiveness from all the sins
Oh God, give me a benefiting knowledge
And lead me to do acceptable activities
Give me wider and halal rizk (sustenance)
And please accept my honest tawba (repentance)
Among the *sholawat* commonly sang by the Muslims is:

Peace be upon the Messenger of Allah
 Peace be upon the beloved of Allah
 Oh God, please save the umma
 From misery and worldly hardship

The practice of *dhikr*, *sholawat* and prayer in general is actually encouraged by Islamic tenets, suggesting that practicing them is a rewardable deed. Doing these Islamic practices would benefit the doers, i.e. on the one hand they do an '*ibada*' by which they will receive a reward, and on the other hand they use them as a medium to mold their *iman* (belief) and religiosity generally. The argument sustaining their practice is founded upon the Qur'anic order: "and recollect God often" (Sura, 33:40), since "the recollection of God makes the heart calm" (Sura, 13:28). The same holds true with *sholawat* as is commanded by Allah in the Qur'an: "Verily Allah and His angels give *sholawat* to Prophet (Muhammad), oh..You the Believers give *sholawat* and great peace to him" (QS:33,56).

Apart from a religious aspect, the Islamic movement conducted by these groups have a sociological significance because it has evolved in several cities, especially in Java. The movement marked the rise of Muslim consciousness and the increase in their religiosity. But it should be noted that it is actually not a new phenomenon, since it was initiated when the rise of Islam was launched in the 1980s²¹. In Indonesia, this phenomenon of Islamic revivalism is evidenced by the fact that Islam has since been practiced devotedly by Muslims. The more salient fact is that many Muslim women have since been wearing *jilbab* (head cover), deeming it as a religious compulsion. Interestingly, this phenomenon of wearing *Jilbab* is started from secular university, such as Bogor Agriculture Institute, and not from Islamic university.

²¹This revivalism took place on the 15th century of *hijra* (Islamic lunar calendar). 'Hijra' literally means to migrate. In Islamic history it refers to the migration of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in AD 622, which became Year 1 of Muslim lunar calendar.

This phenomenon is in some ways interesting, because it contradicts the thesis of modernization held by social scientists. The thesis, linking modernization with secularization merely states that the more modern one, he is increasingly secular. However, this thesis has been challenged by the reality turned out in today's society where there are modern people with high religiosity, and they are not secular as was said by the thesis. Hassan findings (1985) has sustained this new phenomenon, and some theorists such as Robertson and Chirico (1985) have found the reasoning and come to a new understanding about the development of this phenomenon as can be found in all religions.

This religion revivalism is of course related closely to the development of society itself. Modern life which is quite challenging or even threatening the life of society has encouraged them to return to religion because the religion have concepts which is appeasing. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that among those who do *dhikr* or the so-called urban Sufism are modern and educated Muslims. Therefore, it would be not unusual that one finds a Muslim with a nice shirt and tie cross-legged at the corner of the mosque, doing *dhikr* slowly or other activities in the field of '*ibada*'. By chance I met a Director of State companies who is also a sufi movement activists led by Sheikh Kabbani from America. This phenomenon is certainly interesting, considering the Sufism in Indonesia and else where is usually done or embraced by the poor and less educated.

In addition to the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence, this widespread practice of quasi-Sufism, on the other hand, has brought in a spirit of strengthening traditionalism. In the modern era where people in Indonesia tend to reinforce their identity because of the freedom brought by democracy which they profess, Muslims in general at the

grassroots level have used this situation to remould their awareness. Therefore, the *dhikr* ceremony performed several times by a large number of Muslims, as happened in some places, might be just a part of the revival of tradition as seen from the events of reciting *sholawat*. Some groups who usually sang songs that signify homage to the prophet Muhammad has been established. Marawis (a group of traditional Arab music) is often invited to accompany Islamic lectures on television. This music group sings songs with Islamic poetry, which is mostly an expression of respect and love for the Prophet Muhammad. Moreover, in the artist community there are also devout Muslims who created the music arrangement for the Islamic songs, thus causing the songs popular among the public.

Moreover, these symptoms may be traditionalist circles expression to fight the Puritans who have created a situation which threatens the existence of the former's religious practices. As known, the presence of neo-Wahhabi advocating puritanism or fundamentalism had brought a norm "clearing Islam from the non-Muslim elements". The Puritans as adherents of Wahhabism in this case expose the feelings of hostility towards the traditionalists who hold Sunnism. Such an attitude has caused among Sunnis to feel threatened. Thus, religious agenda such as public lectures or reading *sholawat* and *do'a* can be seen as a reaction from among Sunnis to counter puritanism propagated by Puritan circles

Such a reaction is evidenced by the fact that some Islamic figures have criticized Puritanism. An event to discuss the issue of religious practice amongst traditionalists and Puritans, for example, was once held in a village. But this event did not produce anything because among the Puritans turned out not attending the event. Nevertheless, the

traditionalists did not loss their spirit to fight, trying continuously to hold public lectures to discuss everything relating to puritanism. A big banner hang on a street in Bekasi, West Java, inviting Muslims to attend a lecture entitled "A black story of Wahhabism / Salafism : Muslims should unite to counter the snob of the radical and the extremist". This banner suggested that beside the Sunni have been disappointed with the radical Wahhabis, they wanted the public to know about the bad things done by the Wahhabi adherents.

The reaction can be seen as well in the publication of books exploring Wahhabism and Salafism. A book was written by an Indonesian author entitled "Sejarah Berdarah Sekte Salafi Wahabi : Mereka Membunuh Semuanya, termasuk Para Ulama"²². The book which is supported by General Chairman of NU, Prof. Said Agil Siraj received wider audiences. Within 10 months, the book was reprinted eight times. The book has highlighted the history of Wahhabism which has been used by the authority of Saudi Arabia to legitimise its rule, and in return the Wahhabism receives support and protection from the authority. This sect has been used by the Saudi authority as the only legitimate practice of Islam. In addition to this book, there are some books published in Indonesian, including the one written by Abu al-Fadl, a Professor of a university in the USA.

Concerning reaction among the Sunnis against propagation by the Puritans, it's good to show here an event of reciting *sholawat* led by Habib Syech Assegaf in Magelang, Central Java. The lecture by Habib in the event was exposing clearly his disappointment with the *da'wa* of the Puritans and that of Salafi circles in general, which considers religious practices carried out by Muslim in Indonesia as deviating from the true

²²"A Bloody History of Salafi Wahhabi Sect: They Kill All People, including the Ulema" written by Syaikh Idahram.

Islam. In his lecture Habib described the situation about among the Qurais (a respected tribe in Mecca where Prophet Muhammad derived from) when its leader tried to kill the Prophet Muhammad. The Satan, according to Habib, was present in the Qurais assembly in deciding how to do the killing. Satan was indeed everywhere to influence human to deviate from Allah. It provokes Muslims to do bad thing with the aim to make them become its companion in the hell. Habib suggested that all Muslims know that Satan is their enemy because it leads them to hell. It can embody in the form of human. But the problem is that Muslims are unable to identify the Satan.

Habib mentioned further that there was a good Muslim who saw in his dream about the characteristics of the Satan. Habib emphasized that what he described is merely a dream, which was of course not based on Islamic tenets. The dream told us that one of the characteristics of the Satan embodied in a Muslim is that when he finishes a prayer in a mosque, for example, he or she never does a *wird* (litany), but rather he or she directly stands up and leaves the mosque. Habib meant that this Muslim did not even perform any *do'a*. Habib in this sermon described about a habit of the Puritans which is different from the Sunnis who commonly do the *wird* after prayer, finalising it with *do'a*. The Puritansts do not do the *wird* since it is subsumed under *bid'a*, eventhough all the recitation in the *wird* are *do'a* and some are verses of the Qur'an.

Beside a critical sermon, Habib also sang a Javanese song together with the audience as follow²³:

A lot of stupid children talk reciting *tahlil* as *bid'a*

²³Quoted from a video "Jauharul Muharrom", i.e. are religious gathering commemorating Muharram (the first month of Islam) in pesantren Tegal Rejo, Magelang. The video was published by Tina Vision from Kudus, Central Java.

A lot of stupid children talk reciting *sholawat* as *bid'a*

Parents do not answer because of difficulty
But before long the children are in fact insane

A lot of the son-in-law on talk reciting *sholawat* sinful

A lot of the son-in-law on talk reciting sura Yasin sinful

The parents did not answer because not comfortable

Yet it turned out that the son-in-law is out of mind

The Javanese poetry sung by Habib above shows that there are some aspects of Islamic practices, i.e. read the *tahlil*, *sholawat* and *wird*, which have been the target of criticism by the Puritans. In this case Habib did not matter about the neutrality of the practice from the perspective of Islam, but he stated that those who criticize it is insane. What Habib did in this case is to judge Puritan circles, as always done as well by the Sunni ulama in Indonesia. There is a phrase which is usually expressed by Sunni circles in contempt of a Puritan circles. These phrases suggest that "Man lam yakun lahu wirdun fahua Qirdun", i.e. those who do not practice *wird* are (like) monkey. The habit of monkey is to move all the time. It never sit even for a while, so that Muslims who cannot sit for a while practicing *dhikr* after he finish prayer could be like a monkey.

Looking at the widespread movement of *dhikr* and *sholawat* conducted in many cities in Indonesia, we may say that amid the modernization that might bring in it values that confront religious norms, there emerged a new consciousness among Muslim society in regard with their Islamness. This consciousness marks the strengthening process of their religiosity through which they try to practice Islam in a more devout manner. Furthermore, this consciousness

leads Muslims to strengthen their inner aspect of their life by reviving and remolding sufism, with the purpose of building their heart and religious spirit. What is also important in regard with the development of this phenomenon of religiosity is that it constitutes a response of fight from the traditionalist embracing Sunnism against the Puritans whose approach towards Islam is more rational and textual oriented by avoiding to understand the substance and be ignorant about the context. Such a bad response towards puritanism can be seen further through religious gatherings held by the traditionalists who try to present Islam with its goodness, tolerance and accommodative characteristics.

Concluding Remarks

The Sunni ulama in Indonesia are actually being preoccupied by their attempts to re-knit fraternity as a nation of Indonesia after a lot of conflict occurred between Muslims and non-Muslim circles marred by violence. After the conflict in Ambon, minor conflicts continued to occur in many parts of Indonesia. In 2011, for example, suicide bombing at a church in Solo, Central Java, was done by an extremist Muslim. Therefore, the Sunni ulama in Indonesia have tried to appease Muslims to refrain from violence and attacks especially against the Christian. They extend the concept of brotherhood by not restricting it only to the brotherhood between Muslims. In an effort to reduce or eliminate conflicts with the non-Muslims, they introduced the term *Ukhuwwa Wathoniyya* (national brotherhood) and *Ukhuwwa Bashariyya* (human brotherhood) in addition to the *Ukhuwwa Islamiyya* (Muslim brotherhood).

These efforts, however, seemed to get a hindrance because they themselves have been subjected to the criticism by the Puritans in regard to their religious life.

The criticism has certainly led to the Sunni busy arguing, which eventually gave rise to factions even among Muslims themselves. Thus, efforts to introduce brotherhood by the Sunni ulama to fellow Muslims seem to be as if it had run in vain because even at the level of *Ukhuwwa Islamiyya* alone Muslims in Indonesia could not maintain their brotherhood. This is the irony, because amid the need to establish Muslim unity in a variety of its aspects, some Islamic leaders offended verbally other Muslim groups.

As mentioned earlier in this article, some religious practices that became the topic that incurred conflict between the Puritan and the Sunni in Indonesia are actually subsumed under *fiqh* domain (Islamic jurisprudence) which is subjected to interpretation. Nevertheless, the Wahhabi and Salafi do not accept the fact that these practices are the products of *ijtihad* (the exercise of independent judgement) by such a great imam as Shafi'i or Maliki. They ask Muslim to return to the practice of the three generations of *Sahaba*, *Tabi'in* and *Tabiut Tabi'in* as though between this period and the emergence of Wahhabism is a black era which they should discard from the history of Islam. The worst is that the Puritan Muslims in Solo, Central Java, had not only humiliated the Sunni because of the latter's practice of *bid'a* but also inspected those conducting religious activity, such as *dhikr*, asking them forcefully to stop the practice.

The persistence and spread of the Puritan are supported by a similar international movement, a situation that make many people thought that there is a political effort of Wahhabization conducted by certain Islamic countries. With the support of certain funds, the Puritan can move freely and in some cases have succeeded. Through missionary training in campuses and high school²⁴,

²⁴In some campuses developed what is called Lembaga Da'wah Kampus (Institute for Da'wa in Campus) and ROHIS (Islamic Spirituality), a movement in some high schools to mold student religiosity.

they succeeded in creating cadres of students who are ready to develop Islamic puritanism in Indonesia. Another thing that also supports is the political success championed by the Puritans. For example, PKS (the Just and Prosperous Party) has managed to become the party of the top five, obtaining 7.88 percent in the 2009 general election, whereas in the 1999 election the party received below 2 percent of electoral threshold. This means that the political support for the Puritans also continued to increase, although now many people are hesitant to support the party due to the fact that image of its cleanliness is damaged by some of its politicians involved in corruption.

Although it is indicated by the difference in attitudes and even understandings among the Puritans themselves, the political struggle has become an integral part of their agenda, at least as it is carried out by Islamic fundamentalists in other Islamic countries. Some social scientists who have attention on the movement of the Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East, for example, have come to the conclusion that the fundamentalist indeed deem their placement of Islam in political power as a core value of Islam. That is also what the Puritans in Indonesia did, ranging from MMI, Hizbuttahrir and even the Salafi, although the latter seems to never turn to politics. This fact once showed any change in terms of their struggle, formerly confined to the so-called scriptural puritanism while now they are also making efforts to formalization of Islam in national politics. As adopted by the fundamentalists, to implement Islam, according to their premises, requires the seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups. Also, some of the puritans argue, that the true Islam is the one that is interpreted by a specific political group and its leader.

With such measures, then the Puritans in Indonesia are setting two steps, namely to purge Islam of all the things that come from outside Islam, and to try to put it in political power as a step to establish an Islamic state or *khilafa Islamiyya*. At first they will intersect with the circles of Muslim itself, as is evidenced from the many conflicts with Sunni, and in the latter they will compete with secular nationalist to gain greater political positions, in addition to competing with other Islamic political circles. Of these two steps, the first step is realized, because with the orthodoxy to purify pristine Islam from subsequent accretion and alien influences, they do so by disparaging other Islam circles. Although it is good from religious perspective, what is done by the Sunni will nonetheless still be regarded as an aberration by the Puritans. Therefore, there emerged a cynical attitude of some Muslim leaders suggesting that the Puritans often make sharp criticism that incurred conflict with other fellow Muslims than with the non-Muslims.

On the other hand, the Sunni resistance movement in Indonesia against puritanism is also quite loud. What was done by Habib as mentioned above is just one of many movements of traditionalism conducted by Muslims in Indonesia. With the existence of such resistance, then the conflict in the future will be more visible and become a public spectacle. This possibility is based on the fact that the number of those adhering to puritanism is continuously increasing. As would anyone see, their success in doing *da'wa* on campus, for example, has created the cadres who are not only Islam-minded but also tend to be strictly puritan and rigid. The cadre of this course will be ready to fire bullets to the Sunnis who are deemed as deviating from practicing right Islam. Meanwhile, the Sunni circles, represented by the NU community, has also generated among the educated with

a fairly strong ideology. These educated Muslims, either those specifically learning Islam, such as *pesantren* graduates, or those learning sciences generally, have been so enthusiastic to develop Islam embracing *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama'a*. Though they are accommodating in regards to their thoughts and attitudes, they are the young who adamantly defended the Sunni ideology they get from the *ulama* who became their teacher. Their persistence is indeed a product of Indonesian history, which has given rise to polarization between various Islam groups, where they are derived from just one of the existing Muslim groups in Indonesia.

With this situation one can imagine that the medium of *da'wa* in Indonesia will be the battle field where conflicts between factions are to get into place. This conflict can also be more manifested, given political elements have been coloring their propagation. Although the puritans

launch the most interesting Islamic issue, such as the formation of Islamic State, the Sunni circles, particularly among traditionalists such as NU, are not happy. Not only because it is not a must but also effort to realize it is done with coercion and even threatens other Islamic groups. What is more alarming is the fact that the puritans are actually not unified, as written by Ardham, due to their different opinions about how and what they should pursue with regard to their *da'wa*. So, despite coming from the same source, namely the early Wahhabi adherents in Indonesia, and are inspired by the same factor, i.e. movement of Islamism as carried by the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (lit. Muslim Brotherhood), the Puritans are in fact in conflict with each other by offending the other as *kafir*. Since they are characteristically aggressive, the conflict among their own mid would be more manifest, disadvantaging Muslims in Indonesia.

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